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Three years after recognizing a new cause of action for racial redistricting
in Shaw v. Reno,' the Supreme Court's voting rights jurisprudence still teeters
on the brink of legal incoherence and political chaos. Concerned about the new
extremes to which self-interested redistricting has been taken in the
1990s-particularly, but not exclusively, for racial purposes-the Court has
been struggling to articulate legal principles that might fix acceptable
boundaries on the power of politicians to define their constituencies.- But last
Term's unsurprising decisions striking down districts in North Carolina and
Texas,3 like the previous Term's decision invalidating a Georgia congressional
district,4 suggest that these principles remain disturbingly elusive. 5 To be sure,
some speculations have been publicly confirmed, most notably that the five-
member majority crafting these new constitutional constraints is itself
profoundly fragmented.' Yet the precise extent to which election districts can
f Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. For comments. I thank Deborah Malamud,
Rick Hills, Dan Lowenstein, Morgan Kousser, Jonathan Varat. Terry Sandalow, Richard Bnffault. Cass
Sunstein, and Sam Issacharoff. For exceptional research assistance. I thank Jeff Fisher
1. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
2. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting- Dras ng Constitutional
Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MIcH. L. REv. 588, 588 (1993) ("Through the process of redistrcting,
incumbent office holders and their political agents choose what configuration of voters best suits their
political agenda.").
3. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996) (plurality opinion); Shaw v Hunt. 116 S Ct. 1894
(1996).
4. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
5. As Justice Souter correctly stated in dissent last Term. "a helpful statement of a Shas claim still
eludes this Court." Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1998 (Souter J., dissenting). While Justice Souter offered this
concern as a justification for overruling Shaw, I invoke it here as a reason to seek a more useful
implementation framework for Shaw.
6. Shaw itself, in the context of other voting rights cases, could be read to inumate such a nft. See.
e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harns. "'Bizarre Dstrcts. - and Wring Rights
Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno. 92 MIcH. L. REv 483.495(1993) (WIhen
this question [of whether race-conscious districting per se triggers stncl scrutinyl is confronted directly, the
majority in Shaw might well divide over this question."). This past Term. these deep divisions within the
controlling majority blossomed into full public view. In Bush. 116 S. Ct at 1971-74. Justices Scalia.
Kennedy, and Thomas distanced themselves from Justice O'Connor's plurality opinon specifically to assert
that all intentional race-conscious districting required strict scrutiny Meanwhile. Justice O'Connor wrote
a separate concurrence under her own name to emphasize that compliance with section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act constitutes a compelling interest sufficient to Justify race-conscious distncting See id at
1968-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Not only did the Justices above refuse to endorse this position, but
Chief Justice Rehnquist did not sign this separate statement. Indeed, there is reason to think at least two,
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be designed to take race or ethnicity into account remains shrouded in a
doctrinal framework that provides scant practical guidance in the most charged
setting of all for identity and partisan politics.
The relationship of race to the construction of political institutions is a
prominent site in which themes of "Group Conflict and the Constitution," the
topic of this Symposium, are currently being played out. In the redistricting
arena, the Court now appears to have settled on a doctrinal formula through
which it will mediate this particular form of group conflict. In each of the last
two Term's cases, the Court has consistently rehearsed this doctrinal principle:
Race cannot be "the predominant factor" in the drawing of election district
lines.7 This approach to racial group conflict in the political realm organizes
constitutional inquiry around the motivations of those who control the
redistricting process.
This brief Essay seeks to make one narrowly targeted doctrinal point:
Whatever the merits of motive-based approaches to mediating group conflicts
in other constitutional contexts, in the redistricting arena that approach will not
be capable of sustaining constitutional doctrine in a coherent, administrable, or
useful form. This is not due to general theoretical concerns about motive-based
doctrines, but to pragmatic reasons peculiar to the redistricting context. If the
Court's current project of imposing constitutional restraints on race and
redistricting is to be given principled legal content, it will have to be through
another approach. Toward the close of this Essay, I will suggest the most
likely alternative.
With respect to general problems of group conflict and the Constitution,
this Essay's discrete concerns might nonetheless suggest a few broader
implications. At the most general level, I will argue that the Supreme Court's
struggles stem from misguided efforts to assimilate race-conscious districting
to the constitutional framework for other race-conscious government policies.
The now reigning approach to policing racial redistricting, the motive-based
"predominant factor" test, offers the allure of consistency with other areas of
constitutional law. By importing Washington v. Davis8 and City of Mobile v.
Bolden' into redistricting, the Court has cast the Shaw doctrine as continuous
and as many as four, Justices are likely to distinguish or overrule City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S.
156 (1980), and find the results test of amended section 2 unconstitutional.
7. See, e.g., Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488 (discussing whether "race was the predominant factor
motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular
district"); Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1951-52 (plurality opinion) (quoting Miller's "predominant factor" standard);
Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 1900-02 (same).
8. 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (holding that policies facially neutral with respect to race violate
Fourteenth Amendment only when they ultimately rest on "a racially discriminatory purpose"); see
Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (holding that discriminatory purpose under Davis
"implies that the decisionmaker... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group"); City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1980) (extending Davis test to Fifteenth Amendment).
9. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
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with established Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment principles. But this
portrait of continuity is an illusion. At least in the area of race, constitutional
problems of group conflict cannot be approached effectively in universal terms.
Contexts in which issues of race-conscious policy arise turn out to differ in
pragmatic, but central, ways. Whatever the merits of more rigidly "consistent"
approaches in other institutional arenas-approaches that argue for
colorblindness or race-consciousness in all-or-nothing terms-within the legal
system, contextual variations must be attended to if courts are to develop
coherent, administrable legal doctrines.
Thus, whether or not the intent standard of Davis is appropriate for certain
contexts, such as public employment, the effort to borrow this standard for
redistricting is fundamentally flawed. I will stress three reasons that this is so,
though others could be marshalled. First, an intent standard is not properly
linked at the conceptual level to the nature of the constitutional harm that the
Court's racial-redistricting cases recognize. The injuries Shaw makes actionable
are expressive harms, as will be described later; such harms focus on the social
meaning of, and social perceptions about, government action, rather than on
individuated and more material harms to discrete individuals. Once the role of
these expressive harms in Shaw is appreciated, the predominant motive test can
be seen not to be a coherent approach to implementing the decision's
underlying theory. Second, an intent standard emerges out of more
conventional individual-rights adjudication contexts. But Shaw is not best
understood as operating within an individual-rights model of the relevant harm.
Third, in the redistricting arena, the Davis approach will be intractable at the
practical level. Sensible doctrine in this area must recognize that carving states
into election districts differs in essential ways from choosing one of two
applicants for a particular job, or awarding a public construction contract to
one of two competing firms, or granting a broadcasting license to one of two
bidders. In particular, race and partisan politics are too compounded in
redistricting to be separable through motive-based "predominant factor" tests.
Whatever precision such tests might have elsewhere, in the redistricting context
they can only dissolve into ritualistic, vaporous incantations. Inevitably, this
approach will lead to disingenuous judicial decisions; courts simply are not
likely to be able or willing to apply such a standard faithfully. Indeed, this
evasion of artificial doctrinal formulas is already evident in the Supreme Court
itself: The Court has begun to decide cases in ways that cannot be reconciled
with a primary emphasis on ferreting out legislative intent."0
Doctrinal stumbling and confusion about race-conscious districting poisons
politics and culture in particularly pathological ways. Under the best of
circumstances, the drawing of election districts by politicians is nasty, brutish,
and anything but short. Adding race and ethnicity makes the mix even more
10. See infra text accompanying note 137.
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combustible. Unless the Court quickly brings more principled legal ordering
to the framework of racial redistricting, political institutions will become the
site for the most divisive racial and ethnic confrontations seen in many years.
Already in the aftermath of the Court's recent decisions, several states have
become too politically paralyzed to redistrict at all; instead, they have defaulted
the task to federal courts."
This Essay is directed primarily to courts struggling to implement the
Shaw doctrine. The approach here also differs from what might be called "the
ideological turn" that legal scholarship has taken in recent years.'
2
Increasingly, legal scholarship has merged into fields like political theory and
cultural critique as it has sought to tease out the general systems of beliefs,
assumptions, and structures of values embedded within legal decisions. For
some purposes, this work has been immensely valuable; yet it necessarily
downplays characteristic qualities of legal decisionmaking and more internal
styles of legal analysis. Rather than focusing on the fine-grained distinctions
between cases and contexts that more conventional legal analysis stresses, for
example, ideological critique tends to see cases as raising fundamental choices
between competing, broad ideologies. 3 Rather than seeing legal issues as
arising amid specific institutional constraints and within particular complexes
of fact, ideological analyses tend to be framed in terms of clashes between
competing frameworks of values, often conceived at high levels of abstraction.
Because my aim is limited here to the judicial implementation of Shaw,
this Essay is more in the nature of internal doctrinal critique. Thus I do not
engage in the "fundamental" debate that has preoccupied much academic
commentary on the decision: whether race-conscious districting, in the extreme
geographic forms Shaw condemns, ought to be constitutional. Much of the
11. Following the Supreme Court's 1995 decision striking down Georgia's eleventh congressional
district, see Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2475, the Georgia State Legislature was unable to redraw the state's
electoral map and adjourned on September 13, 1995, "effectively leaving the task to [the district court]."
Johnson v. Miller, 922 F. Supp. 1556, 1559 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (three-judge panel). Moreover, following the
Supreme Court's June 13, 1996 decisions, neither Texas nor North Carolina has adopted, or will adopt, new
redistricting plans. In Texas, Republican Governor George W. Bush refused to call the Democrat-controlled
state legislature into a special session, choosing instead to leave the decision of whether to redistrict before
the 1996 elections to the district court. See Vera v. Bush, 933 F. Supp. 1341, 1344 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (three-
judge panel). In North Carolina, while the state's General Assembly had failed to implement a redistricting
plan, the district court granted a stay of remedy and gave the General Assembly until April 1, 1997 to
submit a constitutional redistricting plan. See Shaw v. Hunt, No. 92-202-CIV-5-BR (W.D.N.C. July 30,
1996) (unpublished order, on file with author) (three-judge panel).
12. Cf INTERPRETWE SOCIAL SCIENCE: A SECOND LOOK 1 (Paul Rabinow & William Sullivan eds.,
1979) (discussing "the Interpretive turn" in social sciences during 1970s).
13. As Robert W. Gordon puts it in a recent overview of varying styles of legal scholarship, more
recent approaches to legal scholarship, of which ideology theory is one manifestation, seek to show that
the legal system
has argumentative resources that present varying possibilities for the resolution of every legal
issue .... The opposing arguments often reflect deep conflicts between social visions:
divergent views of efficiency, distributive fairness, the obligation we should have to look out
for one another, and the meaning of "consent" under conditions of need or subordination.
Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the "Middle Ground", 91 MICH. L. REV. 2075, 2092 (1993).
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response to Shaw has predictably, but unproductively, urged that it be
overruled. 4 Yet with five cases now decided in the last four Terms, even
dissenting Justices have recognized that "the Court seems settled in its
conclusion that racial gerrymandering claims such as these may be
pursued."' 5 I take the principle of Shaw to be settled, at least for now, and
for implementation purposes seek to understand the doctrine on its own terms.
Part I begins by explaining Shaw and then challenges prevalent
mythologies concerning racial redistricting and the Voting Rights Act (VRA).
I argue, for example, that certain familiar criticisms of Shaw misunderstand
both the history of the VRA and the present context of redistricting. To
address Shaw effectively requires understanding it as a specific response to
distinct developments in the voting arena. Ironically, however, the specific
means the Court invokes fail to recognize what is distinct about the logic of
voting rights. Thus Part II seeks to demonstrate that the current "predominant
motive" test will necessarily fail as a means of implementing the values Shaw
is best understood to reflect. Finally, the Essay ends with suggestions on how
the realities of the entanglement between race and politics in redistricting can
be better recognized through an alternative approach that provides more
principled guidance in this highly charged arena.
I. VOTING RIGHTS MYTHOLOGIES
Shaw and subsequent decisions hold that race-conscious election districting
will be subject to strict scrutiny and held unconstitutional in certain specific
circumstances. Questions abound at each stage of this inquiry: (I) what precise
triggering facts bring strict scrutiny into play; (2) what state justifications are
sufficiently compelling once strict scrutiny is applied; and (3) what means are
the most narrowly tailored forms of districting once strict scrutiny is applied.
Although the same issues can arise under more than one of these inquiries, this
Essay focuses on the first question as the point of greatest complexity in the
current formulation of Shaw. To begin unpacking that aspect of Shaw, it is
perhaps easiest to start with what the decision does not hold regarding when
strict scrutiny will be applied.
Despite exaggerated claims from both critics and supporters, 6 the Shaw
14. See, e.g., Christopher Eisgruber, Ethnic Segregation by Religion and Race: Reflections on Kiryas
Joel and Shaw v. Reno, 26 Ctr, B. L. REv. 515 (1995-96); A. Leon Higginbotham et al., Shaw v Reno:
A Mirage of Good Intentions with Devastating Racial Consequences. 62 FoRDHIAM L REV 1593 (1994);
J. Morgan Kousser, Shaw v. Reno and the Real Vibrld of Redistricting and Representation. 26 RuTGERs
LJ. 625 (1995); Jeffrey Rosen, Kiryas Joel and Shaw v. Reno: A Text-Based Interprentvst Approach. 26
CUMB. L. REV. 387 (1995-96).
15. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1977 n.7 (1996) (Stevens. J.. dissenung)
16. See, e.g., Andrea Bierstein, Millenniun Approaches: The Future of the %btng Rights Act After
Shaw, De Grandy, and Holder, 46 HAsTiNGS L.J. 1457, 1459 (1995) (asserting that cases including Shaw
"may well sound the death knell for race-based districting"); James F Blumstem. Shaw v Reno and Miller
v. Johnson: Where We Are and Where We Are Headed, 26 COMB. L. REV 503. 506-08 (1995-96)
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doctrine is neither a broad attack on section 2 of the VRA nor an assault on
all intentional race-conscious districting. To be sure, some Justices would
subject all such districting to strict scrutiny; some have gone further and
intimated a willingness to hold the "results" test of section 2
unconstitutional.' 7 As an institution, however, the Court has explicitly stated
that Shaw reflects a judicial effort to distinguish "appropriate and reasonably
necessary uses of race from its unjustified and excessive uses."' The
excessive use of race, not racial classification per se, generates Shaw harms.
That is the principle that critics and supporters of Shaw should be contesting,
not the role of race per se in districting. It is also the principle to which courts
implementing Shaw must give content.
If race-consciousness per se is not harmful except when taken to certain
extremes, one may view Shaw as a judicial effort to draw the highly
contestable line that plagues all civil rights policies, the line between (to use
loaded terms) "nondiscrimination" and "affirmative action." As difficult as this
line is to define in other contexts, it is even more difficult in the area of voting
rights. In contexts like employment policy, it is at least arguable in theory that
nondiscrimination can be achieved through the adoption of employment
practices that do not themselves require race-consciousness. The VRA
addresses the way public electoral structures respond to private voting patterns;
public law must first look to whether those patterns reflect racially polarized
voting, and then, because private voting behavior cannot itself be directly
regulated, reactive public institutions can only respond by themselves adopting
race-conscious programs designed to countervail private race-conscious voting.
That is what the post-1982 VRA does.
As the Court appears to see it, race-consciousness in redistricting is
permissible to ensure evenhandedness; equal rights means that minority voters
have similar opportunities as majority voters to elect "representatives of their
choice." Section 2 of the VRA bans vote dilution, and thus requires that
districting be racially evenhanded; but as the Court construes it, this process
of race-conscious districting is permissible when necessary to ensure equal
rights. When race-consciousness goes beyond this point, the shadow of strict
(contending that Shaw's condemnation of race-conscious districting must extend beyond oddly shaped
districts); Jamie B. Raskin, Affirmative Action and Racial Reaction, 38 How. L.J. 521, 525-26 (1995)
(describing the Shaw doctrine as leading "pervasive effort to undermine" and to "ero[dej" the VRA);
Rhonda Cook & Mike Christensen, Ga.'s 11th District Thrown Out: Justices Say Plan Violates White
Voters' Rights, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 29, 1995, at Al (quoting Georgia's Attorney General as
claiming that Miller signified "a major erosion of the Voting Rights Act"); Jan Crawford Greenburg, Race-
Based Districts Banned: Vote Power of Blacks Jeopardized, CHICAGO TRIB., June 30, 1995, at I (quoting
President Clinton who termed Miller's doctrine a threat "to undermine the promise of the Voting Rights
Act").
17. See supra note 6.
18. Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1970 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 1964 (plurality opinion) (noting
Fourteenth Amendment commitment "to eliminate unnecessary and excessive governmental use and
reinforcement of racial stereotypes").
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scrutiny falls. All this sounds tautological, of course. The Court gives content
to these principles by implicitly comparing what is done when majority and
minority districts are being created. When majority-minority districts comply
with traditional districting principles, and are drawn to redress racially
polarized voting, the Court treats them as constitutionally appropriate because
necessary to secure evenhanded treatment. When race-conscious districting
goes further, by abandoning the principles typically used to draw other
districts, the Court treats race as having been singled out for exceptionally
preferential treatment. The Shaw Court can be understood, then, as holding that
when this point has been crossed, the VRA has been illicitly transformed from
a regime of "nondiscrimination" to one of "affirmative action." Moreover,
redistricting signals this shift more visibly and publicly than other policies: The
maps speak for themselves (the frequency with which editorial page writers
and judges reprint them attests to this belief).' 9
Seen in this light, Show's concern with the "excessive and unjustified" use
of race can be seen as cousin to last Term's decision in Romer v. Evans,:' as
well as other recent, but less controversial, voting-rights cases.2' The fact that
Colorado's Amendment 2 went beyond depriving homosexuals of "special
rights," and so broadly denied legal protections "taken for granted by most
people either because they already have them or do not need them," led the
Court to conclude both that the Amendment failed the rational basis test and
that it rested on an impermissible animus.22 Although Romer reaches a result
liberals applaud, and Shaw one that liberals deride, in both the Court's legal
conclusions implicitly require it along the way to give content to the elusive
line between "equal rights" and "special preferences." Indeed, that distinction
19. Contrast the view presented here with Richard Bnffault, Race and Representanon After Mille v
Johnson, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 45 ("If the value vindicated by Shaw is racial neutrality, then it is
difficult to see why, given the Court's own principles, the concern with ractally 'segregated' districts should
be cabined to irregularly shaped districts and not expanded to invalidate any intentional use of race in
districting ... ").
20. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). In the immediate aftermath of Shaw. many scholars. myself included,
viewed Shaw as the Bakke of voting rights. See Regents of the Univ of Cal v Bakke, 438 U S 265
(1978); Pildes & Niemi, supra note 6, at 503-04. While Bakke. too, sought to permit race-consciousness
while avoiding the excessive use of race, Justice Powell's controlling opinion in Bakke is ambiguous about
whether "excessive" in the academic admissions context refers to theform of an affirmative action program
or the weight given to race. As to form, it is clear that preferences are permitted, but quotas forbidden- As
to weight, it remains more uncertain whether race can be given only as much w%-eight as other "plus" factors
or whether in pursuit of educational diversity race can be given more weight. Thus there remains subtle
ambiguity as to whether the "excessive" use of race Bakke condemns is best characterized as turmng on
the form or the weight race-consciousness is given.
21. In one such case, the Court stated:
[The district court's reading of section) 2 to define dilution as any failure to maximize tends
to obscure the very object of the statute and to run counter to its textually stated purpose. One
may suspect vote dilution from political famine, but one is not entitled to suspect (much less
infer) dilution from mere failure to guarantee a political feast.
Johnson v. DeGrandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2659-60 (1994). DeGrandy is thus similarly constructed around
the axis between ensuring "equal rights" and guaranteeing what some might label -special preferences"
22. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1624-29.
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is now emerging as one of the philosophical touchstones of the current Court's
constitutional jurisprudence.
To provide the factual matrix within which this distinction must be
assessed in the redistricting context, this Part seeks to undermine several
common mythologies prevalent in academic and popular critiques of Shaw. In
previous work, I have addressed voting rights mythologies typically associated
with political conservatives.23 Here, I note four mythologies typically
associated with critics of Shaw.
A. Myth #1: Minority-Controlled Districts in the 1990s Are No More Bizarre
than Districts Traditionally Have Been
Some charge that the Supreme Court has become worried about "bizarre"
districts only now that such districts have emerged to benefit racial and ethnic
minorities.' In a literal sense, this is true: Shaw does not condemn
"extremely bizarre" districts across the board, only those in which race can be
viewed as having played too dominant a role. Should politicians craft highly
contorted districts to protect incumbents, the Constitution would not be
23. See Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of Race: Quiet Revolution in the South, 108 HARV. L. REV.
1359, 1362-76 (1995) (book review). Pointing to a handful of highly visible elections, critics of racial
redistricting often claim that racially polarized voting has diminished in the South and elsewhere; they
allege that black candidates can now get elected with some regularity in majority-white electorates. Two
of the most prominent proponents of this view are Abigail Themstrom and Carol Swain, both of whose
works have been cited for this proposition by Justice Kennedy. See id. at 1366. The most comprehensive
statistical studies, however, continue to conclude that only one percent of white-majority jurisdictions elect
black candidates-meaning that absent "safe" districts, black candidates will be elected in only token
numbers. See id. at 1373.
It should be noted, however, that racially polarized voting is not necessarily tantamount to racially
discriminatory voting, though the two are often treated as the same. But whether in fact the two should be
equated is contestable. As currently defined for legal purposes, findings of polarized voting are based on
bivariate regression analysis, which only correlates race of voters and their preferences over candidates.
Following Justice Brennan's plurality analysis in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 61-74 (1986), most
courts have refused to require more complex, multivariate statistical analyses that would try to determine
more specifically the causes or reasons for differential candidate preferences among black and white voters.
Thus, if 90% of black voters in the Democratic primary prefer Jesse Jackson, but only 10% of white voters
do, this would be a stark illustration of racially polarized voting as the VRA defines it. For a full analysis
of racial polarization issues, see Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The
Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833 (1992). Whether such a pattern
should be treated as evidence of "racially discriminatory" voting requires further argument and analysis.
Black voters and Jesse Jackson might be ideologically much further to the left of the party than the median
Democratic voter; at that point, issues of race and political ideology become sufficiently intertwined that
whether differences in manifested preferences over candidates should be treated as equivalent to racially
discriminatory preferences raises more complex issues. As defined by the current bivariate-regresson
approach, there should be little question that patterns of polarized voting remain prevalent, at least in the
South. "Safe" minority districts do generally remain necessary to the election of black candidates. For
further statistical insight, see infra note 99.
24. See Stanley A. Halpin, Jr., Waves and Backwashes in Voting Rights Law: Recognition Without
Implementation of a New Principle Opposing Gerrymandering, 22 S.U. L. REV. 255, 255-56 (1995);
Pamela S. Karlan, Voting Rights and the Court: End of the Second Reconstruction?, NATION, May 23,
1994, at 698, 698-700; Raskin, supra note 16, at 527-28.
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implicated;' should politicians do so for partisan reasons, the Constitution is
only implicated in theory, not in practice.2 Some critics go so far as to view
this as a "racial double standard": Bizarre minority-majority districts are
subject to constitutional challenge, while bizarre white-majority districts are
not.27
In the redistricting context, at least, this rhetorically forceful charge ignores
dramatic recent developments evidenced in the 1990s round of redistricting.
For several reasons, the creation of bizarrely configured districts exploded in
the 1990s. Much of this development is directly attributable to race-conscious
districting. Even where it is not, there is reason to believe that such districting
indirectly influenced the rise of bizarre districting through its effects on the
culture, as opposed to the formal law, of redistricting. To the extent minority-
controlled districts are far more extreme in shape than other districts, or to the
extent that the VRA and race-conscious districting is a significant cause of
whatever new extremes might be found in white-majority districts, Shaw needs
to be assessed as a response to genuinely novel developments. The evidence
does indeed establish that this is the case.
One means of documenting these changes is to quantify the rise of "highly
bizarre" congressional districts in the 1990s. This can be done through
numerical techniques that assess district shapes. "- For purposes of Shaw, one
relevant measure focuses on the perimeter of districts, assaying the extent to
which borders meander to include selected voters. A second relevant measure
focuses on the dispersion of districts, testing how efficiently a district
encompasses its territory. Both measures start from the baseline of a circle as
the ideal district shape. At this stage, we need not ask the normative question
25. For criticism of this result, see Sally Dworak-Fisher. Draw% tg the Line on Incumbency Protection.
2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 131 (1996).
26. Thus Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). has never been applied by a lower court to strike
down any districting plan for a legislative body at any level of governance.
27. See J. Morgan Kousser, Shaw v. Reno and the Real World of Redistncting and Representanon,
26 RuTGERS L.J. 625,652-53 (1995) (contending that in implementing Slw. Court cannot avoid invoking
racial double standard); Laughlin McDonald, Can Mimorit Voting Righis Sureive Miller v Johnson?, I
MICH. J. RACE & L. 119, 150-53 (1996) ("Shoiy and Miller are fairly open to the charge that they embody
an impermissible double standard."); Conference, he Supreme Court. Racial Politics, and the Right to
Vote: Shaw v. Reno and the Future of the Voting Rights Act. 44 AmrI. L. REV. I. 17 (1994) (comments of
Brenda Wright); Jamie B. Raskin, Gerr)mander Hypocrsy: 77Te Supreme Court's Double Standard.
NATION, Feb. 6, 1995, at 167 ("Racial double standards are nothing new in American law, but the Supreme
Court's voting rights jurisprudence has turned farcical.").
28. There are numerous measures of compactness in the academic literature, and these measures can
produce conflicting results. See MICHAH ALTMAN. WHAT ARE JUDICIALLY NIANAGMABLE STA DARDS FOR
REDISTRICTING? EVIDENCE FROM HisTORY (Cal. Inst. of Tech Social Science Working Paper No 976,
Aug. 1996). Nonetheless, for purposes of applying Shaw, the point is not to rank order all distrcts. but to
identify some threshold of extreme bizarreness in compactness. Various measures of compactness tend to
converge in extreme cases, see id. at 10, and Shaw is designed to deal with only such cases Second, which
measures to use depends on the purpose to which the measurement is being put; for reasons explained in
Pildes & Niemi, supra note 6, at 557-59, the permeter. dispersion, and possibly population measures
appear most tailored to the kinds of concerns Shaw addresses. Given that the doctinne deals only with
extreme districts, the choice of particular measures might in any event matter less here than in a general
analysis of compactness.
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of what values reasonably compact districts might serve, nor what the ideal
baseline for assessing compactness ought to be. The aim initially is to see
whether we can identify significant recent changes in districting practices
before turning to the possible legal implications.
Using these measures, I have compared the compactness of congressional
districts in the 1980s and 1990s on a state-by-state basis as well as nationwide
in the aggregate. The results are reproduced in Appendix 1. Nationwide,
substantially more congressional districts in the 1990s than in the 1980s can
be considered "highly bizarre."29 With respect to district perimeters, taking
an arbitrarily selected threshold, there were only sixteen districts below this
level in the 1980s, while in the 1990s there were fifty districts-more than
three times as many. Similarly, using an arbitrary threshold for the dispersion
measure, there were twenty-five districts in the 1980s spread out more
diffusely than this level, while there were forty in the 1990s. In other words,
congressional districts became dramatically more bizarre in the 1990s than they
were in the 1980s. Moreover, these aggregate nationwide data obscure even
more remarkable changes in states that created new minority congressional
districts in the 1990s. Using the perimeter measure, in North Carolina, the
average compactness of congressional districts fell a dramatic 70% in the
1990s; in Louisiana, it fell 62%; in Texas, 50%; in Virginia, 43%; in Georgia,
35%. In four states, Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas,
dispersion scores dropped at least 20%. In states with new minority districts,
therefore, the average compactness of all districts plummeted.
This transformation in the pattern of districting can be documented in
another way. We can compare the frequency with which political subdivisions,
such as counties, cities, and towns, were divided across multiple congressional
districts in the 1990s compared to the 1980s. From judicial findings and
documents discovered in litigation, Professor Timothy O'Rourke has collected
such information; the results parallel those in the compactness studies.3" In
North Carolina, congressional lines had largely adhered to county boundaries
in preceding decades. In the 1980s plan, only four of the state's hundred
counties had been split. In the state's original plan for the 1990s, subsequently
invalidated in the Shaw litigation, forty-four counties were split; indeed, seven
counties were fragmented into three congressional districts. Not only were
counties split, but "'a large number of divided precincts' also emerged in the
1990s. 31 In Texas, the 1990s redistricting plan, since struck down, split thirty-
29. For technical definitions of these measures, see Pildes & Niemi, supra note 6, at 554-56.
30. The data in this paragraph are taken from Timothy G. O'Rourke, Shaw v. Reno: The Shape of
Things to Come, 26 RtTGERs L.J. 723, 762-64 (1995).
31. Id. at 763-64 & n.181 (quoting Memorandum to Members of the North Carolina General
Assembly from Gerry F. Cohen, Director of Legislative Drafting, North Carolina General Assembly, 1992
Congressional Base Plan #10: Split Precincts (Jan. 23, 1992)). This memorandum goes on to say that these
precincts were divided for the specific purpose of achieving desired levels of black population in the two
black-majority districts this plan created.
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five counties and more than 160 cities, while the 1980s plan had fractured only
ten counties. In Georgia, the 1980s plan had divided three counties, while the
1990s plan, also invalidated, split twenty-six counties. Yet another since-
invalidated 1990s redistricting plan, Louisiana's, fragmented twenty-eight of
the state's sixty-four parishes; that state's 1980s plan had divided only seven
parishes. Recent judicial findings from Virginia reveal that that state's 1980s
districting plan had split three counties and two cities between districts; the
1990s plan divided eight cities, all split by the one majority-black district (the
Third Congressional District) the state created in the 1990s.32 Of the
seventeen localities comprising this district, eleven were split between two
congressional districts, with the borders closely tied to racial demographics. 3
To be sure, partisan aims have driven gerrymandering as long as districted
elections have existed, and on occasion, have generated similar tactics.3 And
thus far, the available data enable relatively easy systematic comparisons only
of congressional districts between the 1980s and 1990s.35 Nonetheless, it is
clear that the 1990s have witnessed a precipitous and systematic decline in the
regularity of congressional districts.
To what extent are the VRA and race-conscious districting responsible for
this proliferation of extreme district shapes? Appendix II lists the twenty-eight
most bizarrely shaped congressional districts in the immediate aftermath of the
1990s redistricting; certain of these districts were later judicially invalidated
under Shaw. Of these twenty-eight districts, thirteen were minority-dominated
districts. Of the remaining fifteen, between five and eight shared substantial
borders with one of these contorted minority districts and were therefore
necessarily contorted as well. Of the remaining seven to ten districts, two
reflect the contorted geography of the unusual terrain they encompass: District
36 in California is noncompact because it includes two islands, and District 10
in Massachusetts includes Cape Cod and nearby islands. Thus, as few as five
and as many as eight of the twenty-eight most bizarre districts were white
districts neither mapping onto contorted natural geography nor adjoining oddly
shaped minority districts. 36 Put another way, the direct effect of race-
conscious districting on the general pattern of declining compactness appears
32. See Moon v. Meadows, No. 3:95CV942, 1997 WL 57432. at *4-6 (E-D Va 1997)
33. See id.
34. Perhaps the most notable example was during the aftermath of Reconstruction As the first step
toward black disenfranchisement in the wake of Northern withdrawal from the South, southern legislatures
drew certain exceptionally tortured congressional distncts. designed to dilute black electoral power by
packing black voters into particular districts and eliminating their role elsewhere This process has been
brilliantly documented in the work of Morgan Kousser See. e g. J Morgan Kousser. The Voting Right
Act and the Two Reconstructions, in CoNTROVERSIES IN MINORiTY VOTt NG 135 (Bernard Grofman &
Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).
35. Before then, the data are not available in a digitized form that facilitates relatively easy statistical
analysis. Only in recent years has the United States Census Bureau digtuzed geographical information
36. These extremely bizarre white majority districts are FLA CD 22. MA CD 3. NY CD 5. NY CD
9, TN CD 4, and arguably NY CD 8, NC CD 5, and TX CD 6 See Appendix I1
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quite substantial. But there is a more subtle and indirect way that the VRA and
racial redistricting in recent years might have contributed even to those few
extremely bizarre white-majority districts not adjoining minority ones.
Although it would be difficult to prove conclusively, I suspect that race-
conscious districting has intersected in the 1990s with other developments that
together have brought about a general decline in tacit constraints that
previously constrained interest group politics, including pursuit of partisan self-
interest, during the intensely political process of districting. Three factors
changed during the 1980s that account for this transformation: technology
improved; constitutional doctrine shifted in the reapportionment area; and
statutory obligations to avoid minority-vote dilution under the VRA were
substantially enhanced. Taken together, these factors have facilitated
gerrymandering on a new scale. In assessing Shaw, it is tempting to try to
isolate the distinct and direct contribution to the proliferation of bizarre
districts of recent race-conscious districting under the VRA. After all, Shaw is
not a comprehensive antigerrymandering doctrine; it is directly targeted at
racial gerrymandering alone. Thus if Shaw is to be justified as a response to
the general new context of redistricting, it seems appropriate to ask how much
the particular factor Shaw addresses-race-conscious districting-has
contributed to this general phenomenon. Yet the effort to isolate the
independent contribution of each of the three new factors might well be
mistaken. In practice, these contributing factors are probably not independent,
but synergistic. Each has enhanced the role of the other in fostering more
aggressive gerrymandering in general.
For example, the statewide data in Appendix I are striking in that every
state in which perimeter or dispersion measures plunged dramatically
(including those involving far more pervasive splitting of counties) had created
at least one new minority district in the 1990s under the pressure of the post-
1982 VRA. Redistricting is ugly and nasty precisely because, for political
parties and incumbents, self-interest and even survival is so strongly at stake.
Given the incentives, the question is why should any constraints check the
process at all? My speculation is that, like many public processes, redistricting
was structured not only by formal legal requirements regarding what is
permitted and prohibited, but also by a set of taken-for-granted background
cultural norms.37 Collective understandings accepted on all sides, some
explicit, some tacit, constrained to some extent the crassest forms of the
pursuit of political self-interest. In some states, such as North Carolina, there
37. For the argument that informal norms are as important as formal legal rules in structuring various
collective interactions, see Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 2055 (1996). For the view that policymakers must attend to the cultural consequences of public
policies, as well as more direct and tangible consequences, see Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural
Consequences of Public Policy, 89 MIcH. L. REV. 936 (1991); and Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive
Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
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were strong presumptions against dividing counties. In others, certain districts
were so irregularly shaped that were they proposed, they would immediately
have been laughed off the table.
Apart from its direct effects, the VRA in the 1980s might have influenced
this general culture of redistricting. Once it became permissible to violate
various traditional tacit norms such as compactness to comply with the VRA,
these tacit understandings might have eroded more generally. Texas, for
example, was aggressively and successfully gerrymandered for partisan
purposes in the 1990s, including several extremely bizarre white districts
whose contorted shapes were not necessary to accommodate minority
districts.38 The VRA was not the only source of attack on the tacit norms of
the prior redistricting culture. The sharp drop in general compactness in those
states that created new minority districts might reflect, in part, the indirect
effect of the VRA on these important, previously assumed constraints. 9
Finally, as discussed later,40 a new constitutional doctrine created in the 1980s
and technological advances also encouraged and facilitated the recent rise of
bizarre districts.
The principal point is that redistricting in the 1990s cannot be portrayed
as business as usual. Untangling the precise causal contribution of the factors
driving the radical decline in district compactness is not easy, particularly if
some of these factors are interdependent. But the creation of safe minority
districts certainly played a significant direct role in these developments, and
perhaps a more subtle, indirect one as well. Shaw thus needs to be appraised
as a response to specific developments in redistricting in the 1990s. The failure
to do so renders critique unresponsive to concerns that might motivate or
justify Shaw.4
38. Thus, on a scale that runs from 0 to I. the average penmeter for the Texas districts measured 0 26
in the 1980s and 0.13 in the 1990s. See Appendix 1. For additional discussion of the general presence of
highly contorted districts in Texas, see Bush vi Vera. 116 S. Ct. 1941. 1982 & n.18 (1996) (Stevens, J.
dissenting).
39. That at least some judges seem to perceive these dynamic interactions at work between the VRA
and other aspects of redistricting culture is testified to by Don Verrilli's description of the reaction of the
three-judge panel to the 1990s Florida redistricting plan at issue in Jolson v. DeGrandy. 114 S Ct. 2647
(1994):
[The judges] thought it was an outrageous effort to manipulate lines for partisan reasons, to
protect incumbents; districts would be drawn with these litle blips in them to make sure that
the incumbent's residence was inside the district, and things like that
And that delegitimated the whole enterprise. I thought. in the eyes of the court and made
it much more vulnerable ultimately to the Voting Rights Act challenge. There was a sense that
this plan wasn't entitled to any real deference as an exercise of democratic politics, that this
thing stunk and of course it was a partisan gerrymander and they weren't going to let you use
the Voting Rights Act in this way.
Conference, supra note 27, at 16 (statement of Donald B Vemlh. Jr).
40. See infra Part IlH.
41. Thus, Justice O'Connor herself, writing for the plurality last Term in Bush. explained the Court's
continued commitment to Show by suggesting that the docirine has led legislatures to "reembrace I the
traditional districting practices that were almost universally followed before the 1990 census ' Bush. 116
S. Ct. at 1964 (plurality opinion).
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Thus it is true in constitutional theory (at least for the moment) that bizarre
districts can be drawn without constitutional concern for groups not identifiable
in racial terms-"farmers, or Republicans in a Democratic region of the state,
or gays, for that matter.' ,42 In actual practice, such districts do not exist,
certainly not in any systematic pattern. While Shaw does formally single out
race-conscious districting for distinct constitutional treatment, then, the doctrine
more closely mirrors the actual political practices of current districting than
many critics acknowledge. That does not in itself, of course, justify Shaw, but
it should frame the terms in which Shaw is debated.
B. Myth #2: The Court Is Effectively Overturning Carefully Considered
Congressional Policy Judgments Enacted in the VRA
Shaw is also sometimes criticized as inappropriate judicial resistance to
policy decisions previously, and more appropriately, adopted in Congress.43
On this view, the Department of Justice and state redistricters are engaging in
race-conscious districting that Congress has required or authorized; Shaw is
therefore tantamount to judicial undermining of the VRA. To the extent that
civil rights groups won a hard-fought political struggle in the 1982
Amendments, the courts should not interfere with, but rather ought defer to,
these legislative policy choices, particularly in such a charged political arena.
In effect, this critique portrays Shaw as directly colliding with the VRA that
Congress adopted.
This view, however, rests on a highly stylized and unrealistic account of
the 1982 Amendments. Courts and commentators often portray statutes and
legislative intent as if they resolve more than they do. Once the veils of
ritualized pieties about congressional intent are pierced, it simply becomes
implausible to claim that Congress enacted and the President signed legislation
that contemplated, let alone required, the kind of race-conscious districting at
issue in the Shaw cases. I do not mean that Congress did not contemplate that
the 1982 Amendments would require race-conscious districting; the fairest
inference from the legislative process is that Congress did understand that
some forms of race-conscious districting would be required. But it is the kind
of districting at issue in Shaw, the use of extremely contorted districts that split
counties, towns, and cities so freely, that cannot be claimed to emanate from
a deliberative national policy choice. The method of interpreting statutes to
imaginatively reconstruct what the enacting legislature would have done with
42. Pamela S. Karlan, Just Politics? Five Not So Easy Pieces of the 1995 Term, 34 Hous. L. RBV.
(forthcoming Summer 1997) (manuscript at 40, on file with author).
43. See, e.g., id. at 45 ("Nothing in the Court's wrongful districting opinions explains why traditional
districting principles-if such there be-are so valuable that the judiciary should step in to reinstate them
when the political branches adopt a richer, more inclusionary democratic theory.").
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a question it did not confront often cannot yield intelligible answers.' But if
any answer is plausible here, it is surely that Congress would have rejected any
assertion that the 1982 Amendments required the kind of extremely bizarre
race-conscious districting now at issue. Other justifications for these districts
might still be offered, but critics of Shaw cannot credibly invoke a fictive
legislative choice that, realistically, never was made. A brief review of the
legislative context in 1982 will reveal why.
First, the principal focal points of vote dilution litigation in 1982 were at-
large and multimember election systems.45 In this context, a bloc-voting and
hostile majority could maintain complete domination of electoral politics
through its ability to outvote a vulnerable minority for each and every seat.
Vote dilution was tantamount to utter exclusion from political office holding
and, most likely, political influence.' The primary objective of litigation was
to force the restructuring of these systems into single-member districts in
which minorities would be able to control some number of seats. But the
emphasis was on how liability would be established when challenges were
brought to at-large and multimember systems. The major cases Congress drew
upon in 1982 all involved such challenges. Given this priority, little attention
was directed toward the question of precisely how single-member districts
would be designed once the remedial stage was reached. Moreover, vote
dilution challenges to the way districts were arrayed within a single-member
districting plan were still largely problems for the coming years. Indeed, only
in 1993 did the Supreme Court finally hold that the doctrinal framework
developed previously would apply to dilution challenges to redistricting
plans.47 Precisely how the concept of vote dilution would apply in this
distinct context was complex, uncertain, and hardly central, let alone on the
agenda, during the 1982 congressional debates. Whereas dilution in at-large
and multimember elections sought to replace one form of election with
another, challenges to single-member districting plans presented a vast array
of potential alternatives for laying out the pattern of districts. And while
dilution in at-large and multimember systems might be tantamount to total
exclusion, once elections took place through individual districts, the questions
of dilution and effective minority influence became more subtle."5
The 1982 Amendments incorporated a "results" test into section 2 of the
VRA, which bars any voting practice that "'results in a denial or abridgement
44. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and ti the Courtroom. 50 U
CHI. L. REv. 800, 810-11 (1983) (endorsing such method).
45. For the relevant history of this period, see generally BERNARD GROI-.IAN IT AL, MINORITY
REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY (1992).
46. This insight comes from Samuel Issacharoff. Groups and the Right to Vote. 44 E,ORY L J 869.
880 (1995) ("Under such circumstances, 'dilution' was a functional proxy for cxclusion. plain and
simple.").
47. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40-42 (1993).
48. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
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of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote," even without proof of
discriminatory purpose.49 It is essentially this provision that the Department
of Justice and state .redistricters, as well as critics of Shaw, invoke to claim
that the VRA required or supported the extremely bizarre race-conscious
districts at issue." When Congress amended section 2 this way, we can say
for certain that Congress intended to reject the Supreme Court's holding in
Mobile v. Bolden. There, in a challenge to at-large city council elections, the
Court held that the Fifteenth Amendment as well as the then-existing version
of section 2 required proof of discriminatory purpose. The decision provoked
an immediate outcry from voting rights lawyers and civil rights organizations;
they argued that the decision reversed Court precedents of the previous decade
and would bring vote dilution litigation to a halt.
In response, Congress did agree to make vote dilution litigation easier and
to reject Mobile. But what Congress understood itself to be erecting in the
place of Mobile-what it understood the "results" test to mean-is far less
certain. One possibility, probably the best description of a plausible collective
understanding to attribute, is that Congress conceived itself to be restoring the
pre-Mobile judicial status quo. The Court's prior decisions, primarily in
Whitcomb v. Chavis51 and White v. Regester 2 defined that prior legal status
quo; Congress repeatedly described the amendments as "codifying the leading
pre-Bolden vote dilution case[s]. 53 The problem, though, was that these
earlier cases themselves had not worked out a coherent conception of vote
dilution. Regester had employed two quite different theories to strike down
multimember districts in two different Texas counties,54 while Whitcomb had
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994).
50. Section 5 requires "covered" jurisdictions to obtain from the Attorney General, or from the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, preclearance for new redistricting plans. Under section
5, the Attorney General must deny preclearance to any new plan that has the purpose or effect of "denying
or abridging the right to vote on account of race." Id. § 1973(c). Because section 2 bars voting practices
that abridge the right to vote on account of race, the Department of Justice maintains that this similar
language requires it to refuse preclearance to any plan that would violate section 2. See 28 C.F.R. §
51.55(b)(2) (1996) (detailing Department of Justice's incorporation of section 2 into section 5).
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia has consistently refused to incorporate
section 2 into section 5's preclearance requirement. See, e.g., Arizona v. Reno, 887 F. Supp. 318, 320-22
(D.D.C. 1995); Georgia v. Reno, 881 F. Supp. 7, 13-14 (D.D.C. 1995); New York v. United States, 874
F. Supp. 394, 400 (D.D.C. 1994). The Supreme Court thus far has declined to address the issue directly,
but may do so in one case before it this Term. See Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Reno, 907 F. Supp. 434,
440-45 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding that section 2 does not incorporate section 5), prob. juris. noted, I t6 S.
Ct. 1874 (1996).
51. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
52. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
53. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 97-417, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 179.
54. In finding the voting power of African-American voters to be diluted in Dallas County, the Court
emphasized several specific electoral features internal to the electoral structure. Thus the Court focused on
majority-vote requirements, "place" rules, and the powerful slating role of a white-dominated political
organization, the Dallas Committee for Responsible Government (recalling the series of White Primary
cases from Texas). The Court also noted racial appeals in recent political campaigns, along with Texas's
past history of racial discrimination in voting. With respect to Mexican-American voters in Bexar County,
the Court's finding of vote dilution centered on almost none of these specific, internal features of the
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rejected a vote dilution challenge to a multimember Indiana district in
circumstances not easy to distinguish from those in Texas. Given the political
attractions of ambiguity55 and shifting of responsibility,- the very
uncertainty of these cases, which recognized that lines had to be drawn
between permissible and impermissible vote dilution claims but which left
those lines murky, perhaps made congressional incorporation-by-reference of
the cases all the more politically attractive.
A second plausible possibility is that Congress simply had no clear
conception in mind of what vote dilution or the "results" test would mean.
That is, Congress might well have had neither a clear conceptual sense of vote
dilution, nor a well-developed practical understanding of what the results test
would mean in application. Remarkably, in light of the dramatic
transformations that section 2 would soon effect, there was little substantive
discussion of this aspect of the 1982 Amendments in the House; debate there
centered on other proposed amendments considered more important and
controversial." Only in the Senate did sustained and focused debate on the
meaning of section 2 begin to emerge. Those debates generate little confidence
that supporters of the section 2 Amendments had a coherent conception of vote
dilution in mind, certainly not at the margins of vote dilution at which the
Shaw problem arises. Whether Congress had a consensus on the concept of
vote dilution with respect to single-member districts even in core or
paradigmatic contexts is not critical for present purposes. Even if it had,
Congress surely did not endorse and had no policy in mind at all concerning
the subsidiary questions at issue in Shaw: whether race-conscious districts that
departed in dramatic and highly visible ways from other districts, such as being
"extremely bizarre" in shape, were appropriate or required to avoid illegal vote
dilution.
On the general concept of vote dilution, all purported to agree that section
2 would not require proportional representation along racial lines. Yet when
asked how a "results" test could mean anything else, proponents referred to a
vague "totality of the circumstances" inquiry that prior cases were correctly
said to have adopted. When the Senate Report attempted to specify these
circumstances, it listed seven typical factors, suggested at least two other
electoral arrangements. Instead the Court emphasized factors external to the practice of voting Itself. such
as the "cultural and economic realities" of this community within Bexar County. While the Court referred
to the vote dilution inquiry as one that focuses on "the totality of the circumstances." it emphasized very
different kinds of circumstances in striking down the multimember districts in the two counties
55. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY. LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE. A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION (1991).
56. See generally Morris P. Fiorina, Group Concentranon and the Delegation of Legislave Authority,
in REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 175. 183-94 (Roger G_ Noll ed. 1985)
57. For a detailed and balanced recounting of the legislative process and history leading to the
enactment of section 2, with a specific focus on what Congress understood vote dilution and the results test
to mean, see Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman. The 1982 Amendments to rite %btng Rights Act"
A Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347 (1983),
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additional factors, noted that in some cases yet "other factors," left unspecified,
would be relevant, and then observed that "there is no requirement that any
particular number of factors be proved, or that a majority of them point one
way or the other."58 A statutory standard that relies on the "totality of the
circumstances" and a laundry list of potentially relevant factors often signals
the absence of clear consensus on the core concept involved. Moreover, in
practice, courts applying such a standard will almost inevitably gravitate
toward one of two alternatives: distilling this range of factors into a few
deemed most essential to enable more rule-like implementation of the standard,
or invoking different factors in different cases in a necessarily more ad hoc
approach. The Supreme Court, as discussed in a moment, almost immediately
opted for the former.
The critical theme here is that the starting point of the section 2
amendments, the "results" test, was from its inception unusually cloudy. This
test was even less clear for challenges to single-member districting plans than
for at-large and multimember elections. The legislative history that would
confirm this cannot be recounted in detail here, but to get a sense of its tenor,
consider the following typical colloquy in the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee
hearing, where most of the section 2 discussion took place. The exchange is
between a Republican supporter of amended section 2, Senator Charles
Mathias of Maryland, and a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee chair and a
skeptic, Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah:
SENATOR MATHIAS: The purpose of this bill is to provide for
fair and just access to the electoral process.
SENATOR HATCH: Is [it] the most fair and just means to
achieve access-if 55 percent of Baltimore is black then 55 percent
ought to be black majority districts?
SENATOR MATHIAS: A fair and just operation of the electoral
process is to give all citizens equal access to vote, run, or otherwise
participate in the process.
SENATOR HATCH: What does "equal access" mean, Senator
Mathias?
SENATOR MATHIAS: You are well aware of what it means.
SENATOR HATCH: I want to know what you think it means,
because I know what it means under the effects test in section 5. I
think it means, as does the Attorney General of the United States,
proportional representation.
SENATOR MATHIAS: You look at the totality of circumstances;
that is what we have been doing.
SENATOR HATCH: That is what we do under the intents
standard.
58. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 207.
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... I am quite confused as to the relevance of the circumstances
that you are considering in their totality.
I do not understand what the question is that the court asks itself
in evaluating the totality of circumstances under the results test. What
precisely does the court ask itself after it has looked at the totality of
the circumstances? What is the standard for evaluation under the
results test?
SENATOR MATHIAS: Look at the results.
SENATOR HATCH: That is all? You are saying that if there was
absolutely no intent to discriminate, as the Court found in the Mobile
case, yet the results were the election of disproportionately few
minority candidates, that a case would be established?59
This brief excursus into the congressional history of section 2 returns us
to the Court's effort to maintain what it seems to view as the distinction
between "nondiscrimination" and "affirmative action" in VRA enforcement.
One way to reflect on the Court's concern is to set it in the broader context of
the history of civil rights policymaking. As policymaking in this arena has
matured, this distinction has paradoxically become increasingly important yet
increasingly blurred. The distinction appears important to public support for
civil rights; support for policies that can be framed as "nondiscrimination" ones
has always been higher than for those characterized as affirmative action.'
Scholars have recently argued that the lesson of thirty years of civil rights
enforcement is that institutional dynamics make it difficult for administering
agencies to maintain this distinction. Thus, John Skrentny has recently asserted
that the pressures of "administrative pragmatism' " almost immediately
channelled the enforcement of Title VII toward more extensive race-
consciousness and an emphasis on bottom-line numbers than its original
proponents would have endorsed.62 In his account, internal administrative
forces pressed policy in this direction long before political pressures or
59. Voting Rights Act: Hearings on S. 53. S. 1761. S. 1975. S. 1992. and H R 3112 Before the
Subcomnu on the Constitution of tie Senate Cotto. on the Judiciary. 97th Cong. 200-0I (1982)
60. See, e.g., RICHARD KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLAss. RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTIoN (1996)
As David Skrentny writes of the era of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. at that time 'anytlung beyond color
blindness had a strange, taboo like quality. Advocacy of racial preference was one of those 'third rils of
American politics: Touch it and you die." JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIR.LATtVE ACTION
3 (1996). For survey results showing widespread rejection of "'preferential treatment" among both whites
and, to a lesser extent, blacks, see id. at 4-5.
61. Administrative pragmatism is the need of organizations, working with often scarce resources, to
find the most cost-effective ways of providing documentable evidence that they are achieving their goals
See SKRENTNY, supra note 60, at I 11.
62. See id. at 115 ("Throughout the 1950s and 1960s. agencies in search of a useful tool for fighting
discrimination were continually led to the affirmative action approach. monitoring numbers and percentages
of African-Americans hired as a measure of discrimination"); see also id at 117-18 (discussing
government-coordinated Plans for Progress initiative of large private businesses during Kennedy
Administration as another early example that gravitated toward affirmative acuon model)
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ideological justifications for affirmative action arose publicly.6 3
Other scholars have argued that the distinction between nondiscrimination
and affirmative action is itself not conceptually coherent,6 or that with the
institutionalization of affirmative action, regulatory capture has become as
prevalent a phenomenon as traditional economic regulation. 5 On this view,
enforcement entities, public and private, became dominated by the programs'
strongest advocates; beneficiary groups are the most effectively mobilized to
press their interests; and iron triangles form between administrators, those who
stand to gain most, and political supporters. Conceptually, politically, and
administratively, the pressures on the boundary between nondiscrimination and
affirmative action are powerful. Yet at the same time, rising skepticism that
this line would or could be maintained became one factor in a backlash against
support for the equal rights model itself.66
In the voting rights context, one interpretation of nondiscrimination would
be that minorities should be descriptively represented in politics in numbers
roughly proportional to their population; this is an outcome-oriented reading
that focuses on bottom-line numbers.67 An alternative reading is more
process-oriented: Minorities are legally entitled to an evenhanded districting
63. As Skrentny puts it:
The point is that a race-conscious society and a reification of difference were not the
ideological goals of the mainstream civil rights movement. Race-conscious justice was a tool
that emerged when the classical liberal litigation tools failed to achieve the classical liberal goal
of nondiscrimination. Whatever the later arguments of philosophers and legal scholars stressing
the justice of race-conscious compensatory hiring, the groups which fought for civil rights, and
often the courts which ruled, were following merely a pragmatic logic.
Id. at 141. When civil rights enforcement became nationalized through the executive branch in the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and the Department of Justice, and through the judicial branch in
the federal courts, the forces of administrative pragmatism inevitably were accelerated. The rise of EEOC
racial reporting form requirements, for example, as well as the rise of disparate-impact litigation, in practice
further edged the legislatively endorsed equal rights model toward an affirmative-action model. See id. at
127-33, 139-41.
64. See, e.g., ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW: THE LAW TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AND EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 253-55 (1993) (arguing that Title VII is itself necessarily race-conscious);
David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 99, 99-100 (asserting conceptual
overlap between nondiscrimination and affirmative action).
65. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 46, at 871 ("Quite simply, it is increasingly difficult to recognize
in the routinized practices of the bureaucratized use of the classifications the aspirations for individual
autonomy and equality that gave the civil rights revolution its powerful moral force."). On the complexities
of institutionalizing racial classifications, see Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: 77te
Determination of "Race" in Race-Conscious Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1231 (1994).
66. Those who currently seek to extend antidiscrimination laws to sexual orientation, in a manner
analogous to Title VII's protections for race, run squarely into this problem: No matter how much
proponents disclaim seeking special preferences and emphasize only equal rights, opponents can tap popular
perceptions about civil rights with considerable success by arguing that such rights will inevitably become
"special rights" and "unfair preferences." For a discussion of statewide ballot campaigns in which such
arguments have played a role, see Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding
the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283, 289-90 (1994). See also Jeffrey S. Byrne,
Affirmative Action for Lesbians and Gay Men: A Proposal for True Equality of Opportunity and Workforce
Diversity, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 47, 72-74 (1993) (listing examples).
67. For the reasons that even this approach would not necessarily yield proportionality between
minority population and representation, see infra note 95 and accompanying text.
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process, but not to districts drawn according to special principles not generally
applicable. It is important to recognize that this tension has arisen only recently
in the VRA field, as the force of litigation shifted from dismantling at-large
and multimember election systems to challenging the distribution of single-
member districts within a districting plan.6"
Shaw reflects the Court's adoption of one interpretation of
nondiscrimination in voting and the Court's conception of itself as the
appropriate institution for limiting race-consciousness in districting to this
point. Substantively, the Court has rejected the outcome-oriented interpretation
of equal rights in redistricting. Institutionally, does the Court's willingness to
embrace this role reflect the view that political and administrative institutions
have proven over the thirty years of civil rights enforcement unable or
unwilling to play this role? When Congress made vote dilution illegal in 1982,
it took no responsibility to give dilution very specific or coherent content. As
bizarre districts flowered in the 1990s, the Department of Justice disclaimed
any role in enforcing any general norms of redistricting;69 as long as more
minority districts were created, the Department would not object. Indeed,
critics charged the Department itself with being the principal force steering the
VRA toward a maximization requirement.
In sum, the 1982 Congress cannot realistically be viewed as having
determined that extremely bizarre minority-controlled districts were appropriate
or required to enhance minority representation. Less expansive understandings
of vote dilution and nondiscrimination in voting were controversial at the time
and the context of Shaw was far off the horizon. Whether Shaw is right or not,
criticism that the Court is overturning carefully considered congressional
judgments is unpersuasive. Shaw is better debated in terms of the substantive
issues its approach raises, rather than in terms of whether it is consistent with
an imagined congressional policy choice.
C. Myth #3: Shaw Is to the 1990s What Plessy v. Ferguson Was to the 1890s
The rhetoric used in critiquing Shaw has at times been stunningly
inflammatory. Some critics directly equate Shaw with Plessy v. Ferguson,
but if that were not enough, others have gone even further: "Five Supreme
Court justices have done to African-Americans in Louisiana what no hooded
Ku Klux Klan mobs were able to do in the decade-remove an African-
68. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
69. When confronted with the "convoluted shape" of North Carolina's Twelfth Distict. for example,
the Department of Justice abjured any authority to evaluate its compactness in any manner, concentraing
instead only on whether the district had "the purpose or effect of minimtzing minority voting strength."
Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461,463 n.2 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (quoting Letter from John R Dunne. Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, to Tiare B. Smiley. Special Deputy Attorney General. State of
North Carolina (Dec. 18, 1991)), rev'd sub nora. Shaw v. Reno. 509 U.S. 630 (1993)
70. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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American from Congress.' Perhaps this rhetoric reflects what Mark Kelman
has recently suggested is characteristic of current forms of identity politics:
"[D]emands will not readily be modulated because, unlike traditional pluralist
'interest' group demands, each group represents not just one of an individual's
many, often conflicting, material interests, but instead represents a critical
aspect of her identity., 72 In such a politics, any loss, whatever the
justification, is tantamount both to complete loss and to all other earlier losses,
whatever their justifications.
To step back a bit from the moment's turbulent ideological struggles, it is
helpful to situate Shaw within the judicial history of these issues. The pre-
history of Shaw has largely been lost in the polarized debates of the present,
but it will no doubt surprise some to discover that, from the start of the
Court's encounter with inclusionary race-conscious districting in the 1960s,
many Justices have viewed this mix of race and democratic institutions with
profound disquiet. Indeed, three of the Court's "liberal" icons-Justices
Douglas, Goldberg, and Brennan-expressed positions not so different from
those in today's Shaw decisions. These three Justices viewed race-conscious
districting either as unconstitutional in all circumstances, a position far more
extreme than Justice O'Connor's today; as unconstitutional in circumstances
comparable to those in Shaw itself; or, at a minimum, as raising profound and
troubling constitutional questions.
In Wright v. Rockefeller,73 an ethnically and racially mixed group of
plaintiffs alleged that New York's congressional districts in the 1960s had
"'segregate[d] eligible voters by race and place of origin"'74 for the purpose
of creating a safe Harlem district that black and Puerto Rican residents would
dominate. A majority of the special three-judge federal court agreed with a
version of the theory Shaw adopted over thirty years later.75 Judge Feinberg,
then a district judge and later a respected figure on the Second Circuit,
concluded that the Constitution would be violated if plaintiffs could prove that
71. Cleo Fields & A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Why the Anxiety When Blacks Seek Political Power?,
NEW ORLEANS TImES-PICAYUNE, July 23, 1996, at B5; see also id. ("In the recent voting rights cases, the
Supreme Court dealt African-Americans a blow almost as cruel as when it issued the 'separate but equal'
doctrine in Plessy vs. Ferguson."). For similar comments, see Higginbotham et al., supra note 14, at 1644
("Absent a change in direction. ... Shaw, like Plessy before it, may have devastating racial
consequences."); Laughlin McDonald, The Counterrevolution in Minority Voting Rights, 65 Miss. L.J. 271,
273-74 (1995) ("[Tlhe Court has launched a counterrevolution which threatens to overthrow the gains In
minority office holding so laboriously accumulated over the past 30 years."); Raskin, supra note 16, at 528
(asserting that Shaw makes no sense unless one assumes that whites have presumptive right to be In
political majority); Frank McCoy, Under Supreme Attack: High Court Decisions Could Erode Hard.Fought
Gains, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Oct. 1, 1995, at 24 (asserting, in aftermath of Miller, that "Black America faces
a new Jim Crow era," and reporting that Shaw line of cases signals "that the second Reconstruction is
over").
72. Mark G. Kelman, Progressive Vacuums, 48 STAN. L. REV. 975, 991 (1996) (book review).
73. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
74. Id. at 53 (quoting plaintiff's complaint).
75. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 211 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
2526 [Vol. 106: 2505
Pildes
the districts' lines had been drawn on a racial basis. In his view, there was no
need to prove vote dilution, because "racially drawn districts per se would also
violate the Equal Protection clause."76 Judge Murphy agreed that "plaintiffs
are not required to prove any diminution or dilution of their voting rights...
once they show that the district lines were constituted on a racial basis.""
They differed over whether sufficient evidence had been presented of
racial/ethnic design for the districts. Had Judge Feinberg found the evidence
any stronger, this three-judge federal court in the Second Circuit might have
invalidated a congressional district on a Shaw-like theory thirty years before
Shaw.
78
The Supreme Court circumvented the profound constitutional questions
presented on the same narrow and questionable grounds upon which Judge
Feinberg relied. Because plaintiffs had not presented any direct proof of
legislative intent to engage in race-conscious districting, but had only offered
as evidence the shapes of the districts and their demographic patterns, the
Court concluded that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of establishing an
intent to use race and ethnicity in drawing the districts. 79 It did so despite the
extreme disparities in ethnic populations among adjoining districts and the way
the districts' contorted pattern of twists and turns managed to include and
exclude the relevant racial and ethnic populations. Through this form of
"judicial minimalism,"80 the Court managed to avoid confronting the
constitutional question plaintiffs had attempted to put squarely before the
Court.
In dissent, Justice Douglas made clear his view that "[r]acial boroughs are
also at war with democratic standards."'" Justice Douglas did not take the
fanciful view that the Constitution required multiracial election districts; he
saw no violation in one racial group's dominating a district (as one necessarily
must) as long as such districts reflected genuine neighborhoods. But when a
district's architecture could "be explained only in racial terms," Justice
Douglas recoiled:
Racial electoral registers, like religious ones, have no place in a
society that honors the Lincoln tradition-"of the people, by the
people, for the people." Here the individual is important, not his race,
his creed, or his color. The principle of equality is at war with the
notion that District A must be represented by a Negro, as it is with
the notion that District B must be represented by a Caucasian, District
76. Id. at 468.
77. Id. at 473.
78. The third judge, Judge Moor, intimated that in his view. absent actual vote dilution. race-conscious
districting did not violate the Constitution. See id. at 467-68
79. See Wright, 376 U.S. at 56-58.
80. For a celebration of such judicial techniques, see Cass R Sunstem. The Supreme Court. 1995
Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1996)
81. Wright, 376 U.S. at 62 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
1997] 2527
The Yale Law Journal
C by a Jew, District D by a Catholic, and so on. The racial electoral
register system weights votes along one racial line more heavily than
it does other votes. That system, by whatever name it is called, is a
divisive force in a community, emphasizing differences between
candidates and voters that are irrelevant in the constitutional sense. Of
course race, like religion, plays an important role in the choices which
individual voters make from among various candidates. But
government has no business designing electoral districts along racial
or religious lines ....
When racial or religious lines are drawn by the State, the
multiracial, multireligious communities that our Constitution seeks to
weld together as one become separatist; antagonisms that relate to
race or to religion rather than to political issues are generated;
communities seek not the best representative but the best racial or
religious partisan. Since that system is at war with the democratic
ideal, it should find no footing here.8"
In the same case, Justice Goldberg, also dissenting, endorsed the position that
because "racial segregation was a criterion in-or a purpose of-the districting
of [an area]," the Equal Protection Clause had been violated.83 This is an
even more demanding motive standard than the one Shaw and its progeny
adopt. The Court now holds that race may be a criterion in or a purpose of




Consider also the words of Justice Brennan, in his exquisitely difficult
struggle with race-conscious districting in United Jewish Organizations v.
Carey.85 Justice Brennan distanced himself from a plurality opinion that
legitimated race-conscious districting without regard to the legal basis upon
which the architects of the redistricting had based their decisions. In contrast,
Justice Brennan was prepared to accept such districting only when section 5
of the VRA required it as a remedial response. In those circumstances, Justice
Brennan argued, Congress had weighed the reasons for and against race-
consciousness, while the Department of Justice would also actively be
monitoring the justifications for the use of race and the scope of its use. In
those specific circumstances, Justice Brennan argued, the use of race-oriented
remedies traced back to "substantial and careful deliberations" in Congress,
leading to "an unequivocal and well-defined congressional consensus" that the
reasons for and against race-conscious voting systems justified "an activist
race-conscious remedial role."86 But beyond where specifically licensed
through section 5 of the VRA, race-conscious districting raised concerns too
82. Id. at 66-68 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations and footnote omitted).
83. Id. at 74 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
84. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1951-52 (1996) (plurality opinion). For a fuller discussion, see
infra Part II.
85. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
86. Id. at 176 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
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troubling for Justice Brennan to endorse. Thus, unlike the plurality, he refused
to reach the question of whether the Constitution permitted race-conscious
redistricting where section 5 did not require it. In justifying this caution,
Justice Brennan observed that race-conscious districting had "the potential for
reinvigorating racial partisanship";17 raised "serious questions of fairness";s
and contained "the potential for arousing race consciousness. '"" Moreover,
Justice Brennan warned, "we cannot well ignore the social reality that even a
benign policy of assignment by race is viewed as unjust by many in our
society" and creates the "impression of injustice.""
Recalling the views of these earlier judges, many of whom occupy the
pantheon of judicial liberalism and constitutional racial egalitarianism, might
bring some perspective to charges that Shaw is the Plessy of our time.
Principles can change, of course, as judges and others learn more about the
complexity and intractability of social problems.9 The fact that judges from
the 1960s until the 1980s expressed constitutional understandings similar to
those in Shaw does not make those understandings right; it does not even
establish that those same judges would hold the same constitutional views
today. But Shaw has polarized the current Court along preexisting cleavages
conventionally identified in politically conservative and liberal terms, and these
divisions encourage casting Shaw as the site of clashing ideological positions
of profound difference. Recovering the historical pattern of continual judicial
concerns with race-conscious districting, which led Justices Douglas and
Goldberg to take an even more aggressive position than Shaw itself adopts,
offers a useful reminder that the mix of race and politics at issue in Shaw has
troubled many judges and Justices, not just the five Justices who make up the
current Shaw majority.92 There is no inherent normative authority in numbers,
87. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
88. Id. at 169 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
89. Id. at 172 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
90. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part); see also id. at 173 ("lAin explicit policy of assignment by
race may serve to stimulate our society's latent race consciousness . .") (Brennan. J .concumng in part)
91. The facts of racial redistricting in these earlier cases can also be said to differ from those in the
current racial redistricting cases, but not in ways that appear to matter to the general constitutional
understandings that these earlier judges expressed. Thus the Harlem district at ssue in Wright v Rockefeller
had an 86% minority population, see 376 U.S. 52, 54 (1964). whereas most districts before the Court today
have minority populations in the 50% to 60% range. But nothing in the constitutional pnnciples these
various earlier judges expressed appears to hinge on these kinds of factual differences.
92. Moreover, even some current Shaw dissenters, notably Justice Stevens, principally object that Sha%
is too narrow, not too broad. Justice Stevens is troubled because Shaw targets "racial gerrymanders" alone.
instead, he would support a more expansive set of universal. Shaw-like constraints on all forms of
gerrymandering. See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 748-50 (1983) (Stevens. J . concumng) As
an incisive and thorough analysis points out, since Justice Stevens's days on the Court of Appeals, and
perhaps influenced by his experience with Chicago politics. Justice Stevens has perceived "an inherent
entanglement of ethnic and partisan politics." Pamela S. Karlan, Cousins' Kin: Justice Stevens and ting
Rights, 27 RUTGERs L.J. 521, 522 (1996). Thus, he has argued that claims of political and racial
gerrymandering must be judged by the same standard, and that both are better handled judicially through
doctrines that focus on the objective effects of redistricting plans, rather than through efforts to determine
their underlying purposes. See id. at 523. 539-40. Those views are very much in line with those that this
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but perhaps seeing the points of continuity between Shaw and prior judicial
views will facilitate more tempered analysis and debate. The suggestion that
Shaw and Plessy are kindred cases undermines serious and credible analysis
of contemporary racial redistricting.
D. Myth #4: Absent Vote Dilution, No Meaningful Harms Can Follow from
the Use of Extremely Bizarre Districting to Enhance Minority
Representation
A fourth criticism of Shaw starts from two factually accurate premises: (1)
that certain minority groups, which the VRA protects, are underrepresented in
typical legislative bodies compared to their proportion of the population (either
voting-age or total population); and (2) that racially polarized voting continues
to be prevalent, particularly in the South.93 Therefore, this argument
continues, we ought to modify territorial districting to any extent necessary to
bring about more racially and ethnically proportional representation.
Note several initial assumptions behind this view. First, it assumes that fair
districting and color-blind voting would produce minority political
representation roughly proportional to population. But this might be too simple.
Districting itself makes proportional representation of various sorts unlikely
along almost any single axis (party, race, religion) unless the relevant divisions
perfectly map onto the geographic units that form the basis for districting.
Second, the ideological preferences of black voters are not distributed
randomly; black voters tend to be considerably more liberal than white voters
and cluster at one end of the distribution of political preferences.94 Whatever
weight these two factors, and perhaps others, ultimately ought to carry, they
need to be taken into account in constructing an appropriate baseline of
"racially fair" representation.95 Second, arguments about proportional minority
representation implicitly emphasize "descriptive representation,"96 or a
"politics of presence" ;97 the argument assumes that our primary concern
should be with whether a sufficient number of officeholders physically mirror
Essay advocates.
93. See supra note 23.
94. Given that the correlation between race and political ideology is so strong, further questions arise
as to whether policy ought to distinguish the two, but I will postpone that further complexity. See infra
Section I.B.
95. The only study I know to attempt to take these factors into account concludes that the current level
of black representation in the United States House is "fair." King's figures are 12% for black population
and 8.7% for black representation in the House. See Gary King et al., Racial Fairness in Legislative
Redistricting, in CLASSIFYING BY RACE 85, 107-08 (Paul Peterson ed., 1995). But work of this sort is still
primitive.
96. HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 226 (1967).
97. ANNE PHILLIPS, THE POLITCS OF PRESENCE 5 (1995) ("In this major reframing of the problems
of democratic equality, the separation between 'who' and 'what' is to be represented, and the subordination
of the first to the second, is very much up for question. The politics of ideas is being challenged by an
alternative politics of presence.").
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the electorate. Public policy might instead put primary emphasis on
"substantive representation" of minority interests, that is, whether the policies
minorities favor are "adequately" given voice, pursued, and adopted. While
descriptive representation might in theory enhance the likelihood of substantive
representation," as a practical matter in the American redistricting context,
more proportional descriptive representation might be achievable only at the
weighty cost of declining substantive representation."
For now, however, assume that descriptive representation ideally ought to
be roughly proportional. Given that commitment, there are two versions of the
argument against allowing compactness to stand in the way of enhanced
minority representation. The first asserts that bizarrely drawn districts do not
impose harms unless they are a means of diluting the voting power of some
cognizable group; departures from compact districting ought not be troubling
because compactness itself does not reflect important substantive values." °
A more subtle version acknowledges the genuine social costs of the kind of
districting at issue in Shaw, but considers those costs trumped by the benefits
of enhanced minority political representation.'
The first version argues that the values associated with geographically
compact districts have become anachronistic. Technology, media markets, and
campaign methods now minimize any direct connection between the ability of
representatives and constituents to communicate and the geographic
98. For the most incisive analysis of this argument. see id at 1-57. 145-67
99. See Pildes, supra note 23, at 1376-91. The most recent and technically sophisticated study of
congressional elections is Charles Cameron et al., Do Majoriry.AInony Districts Maimize Subsrantive
Black Representation in Congress?, 90 AM. POL. St. REiv 794 (1996). with respect to descriptive
representation, or the election of black candidates, this study concludes that to get to the 50% probability
level of electing a black Democratic congressional candidate. districts in the South need a black voting-age
population (BVAP) of 40.3%; in the Northwest, a BVAP of 47 3%; and in the Northeast. a BVAP of
28.3%. Thus this study suggests that, "lilt is rarely necessary for minority voters to be a clear majority
within a district to have a good chance of electing a minority representative, and the 65% rule enforced by
the courts certainly seems excessive." Id. at 804.
Even more interesting are the results on the tradeoff between descriptive and substantive
representation. Substantive representation is measured by votes on civil rights legislation- Again. regional
variation is crucial. Outside the South, the best circumstance for maximizing the political influence of black
voters is when black voters are distributed equally across all dtsticts- That is. two distncts with 25% BVAP
will be better, in terms of influence on civil rights legislation, then one district that is 50% BVAP and one
that is 0% BVAP. See id. at 807--08 ("Majority-minority disticts make little sense in this context, unless
they confer significant nonpolicy benefits, as they create greater possibilities for electing Republicans in
other districts.").
Within the South, this study confirms that the relationship between BVAP and political inlluence is
more complex. While representatives are generally more liberal as the BVAP of their distincts goes up. this
responsiveness flattens out when the BVAP is between 25% and 35%. Above those levels, significant
improvements in responsiveness do occur. In terms of influence on policy, there is no reason to construct
districts with BVAP between 25% and 35%. Putting these effects together, the study concludes that in the
South, the approach that maximizes the influence of black voters is to construct as many districts as
possible that are around 47% black, with the remaining black voters distributed as evenly as possible over
other districts.
100. For an extensive critique of geographic compactness along these lines, see the lower court opimon
in Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 472 n.60 (E.D.N.C. 1994). rev'd. 116 S Cr 1894 (1996)
101. For one form of this argument, see K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY G.ITANN. COLOR CONSCIOUS
161-62 (1996).
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compactness of a district." 2 Thus districts can be functionally compact even
when geographically diffuse and sprawling. 3 Others dispute this view,
arguing that geographic compactness does continue to facilitate better
representative politics and better cultural relations; they offer studies, for
example, that show that constituents appear more likely to identify their
representatives in compact districts, or they argue more speculatively about the
benefits from linking social services and economic development to
geography."'4
Whatever the merits of these debates, they are framed around an internal
perspective on compactness. But Shaw must be understood as concerned with
compactness for external reasons as well. That is, while the Court's language
has at times suggested concern with how noncompact districts affect tangible
relationships specific to the particular district,'05 the cases are better
understood as being more focused on how these districts are socially perceived
and the messages they seem to convey about the relationship of race and
politics. As Justice O'Connor directly put it this Term, these districts "cause
constitutional harm insofar as they convey the message that political identity
is, or should be, predominantly racial."'0' Both the majority and dissents now
102. See BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 32-33 (1984).
103. Bernard Grofman proposed a modification of traditional compactness tests in the form of a
"cognizability" standard. This standard also appears to have been concerned primarily with compactness
from the internal perspective; it was offered as a means of testing whether a district was functionally
compact:
I wish to argue that districts can be so far from cognizable that they violate what we might
think of as a due process component of equal protection by damaging the potential for "fair and
effective representation." By "cognizability," I mean the ability to characterize the district
boundaries in a manner that can be readily communicated to ordinary citizens of the district in
commonsense terms based on geographical referents....
Egregious violations of the cognizability principle can be identified by making use of
standard criteria of districting, such as violation of natural geographic boundaries, grossly
unnecessary splittings of local subunit boundaries (such as city and county lines), and
sunderings of proximate and contiguous natural communities of interests.
Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had Said: "When It Comes to
Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything, It's the Only Thing"?, 14 CARDoZO L. REV. 1237, 1262-63 (1993)
(citation omitted).
104. On studies of constituent identification, see Pildes & Niemi, supra note 6, at 538 n.177. On the
importance to social integration of geographically organizing social services, see MICHAEL J. PIORE,
BEYOND INDIVIDUALISM (1995). Piore argues that:
An increased emphasis upon geographic unity would also serve to enlarge the borderlands and
diffuse the tensions associated with emerging social structure. Their impact in this regard could
be enhanced by a greater emphasis upon geographically defined units in the delivery of existing
social services and in the design of new programs to meet the demands of the emerging identity
groups. Ultimately, the geographic organization of social services could provide a way of
bridging the gap between the social and economic structures and making economic constraints
more salient to those demanding social services.
Id. at 191.
105. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993) ("The message that such districting sends to
elected representatives" is that "their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group,
rather than their constituency as a whole.").
106. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1962 (1996) (plurality opinion); see also id. at 1972 (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (endorsing this description of constitutional harm).
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describe the injuries Shaw acknowledges as "expressive harms.' t"7 Thus,
compactness now matters constitutionally not only or necessarily intrinsically,
but as a means to guard against these expressive harms. Compact districts, in
the Court's view, help constrain state expression of an unconstitutional view
regarding the structure of political institutions, the nature of political identity,
and the relationship between race and politics.
From this perspective, we are now better positioned to consider the values,
if any, that might be reflected in compactness requirements. (I will consider
this as a general matter, leaving aside distinct questions about
constitutionalizing such a norm.) Even that does not frame the question
precisely enough, for the issue is not as much the affirmative values of
compactness as the harms associated with extreme departures from it. The two
are not the same; even arbitrarily chosen baselines, which reflect no affirmative
values except the need to have some baseline, can establish formal landmarks
around which social understandings and norms about fair dealing,
evenhandedness, reciprocity, and cooperation on terms of mutual respect can
come to be organized."' Based on the data discussed above, the issue must
be refined still more: Whether extreme departures from a baseline like
relatively compact districting-when pursued selectivelyfor particular ends but
not others-should be understood to impose meaningful social costs. A general
failure to adhere in fact to laws and practices that are publicly endorsed and
legally required might raise concerns about hypocrisy of public policy; the
selective failure to do so might raise distinct concerns about manipulation for
partial ends.
107. Id. at 1964 (plurality opinion) (citing "'the nature of the expressive harms with which wc ate
dealing"); id. at 2002 (Souter, J., dissenting) ('This injury is probably best understood as an 'expressive
harm,' that is, one that 'results from the idea or attitudes expressed through a governmental action, rather
than from the more tangible or material consequences the action bnngs about.') (quoting Pildes & Niemit.
supra note 6, at 506-07). For a fuller effort to articulate the expressive harms Shim- appears to recognize,
see Pildes & Niemi. supra note 6:
One can only understand Shaw. we believe, in terms of a view that what we call
expressive harms are constitutionally cognizable. An expressive harm is one that results from
the ideas or attitudes expressed through a governmental action, rather than from the more
tangible or material consequences the action brings about. On this view, the meaning of a
governmental action is just as important as what that action does. Public policies can violate the
Constitution not only because they bring about concrete costs, but because the very meaning
they convey demonstrates inappropriate respect for relevant public values. On this unusual
conception of constitutional harm, when a governmental action expresses disrespect for such
values, it can violate the Constitution.
Sh w therefore rests on the principle that, when government appears to use race in the
redistricting context in a way that subordinates all other relevant values, the state has
impermissibly endorsed too dominant a role for race The constitutional harm must lie in this
endorsement itself: the very expression of this kind of value reductionism becomes the
constitutional violation.
Id. at 506-09 (footnote omitted).
108. For a discussion of the relationship between social norms, such as reciprocity, and formal law.
see Pildes, supra note 37.
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The most aggressive challenge to Shaw is that bizarre districting for race-
conscious ends, unlike vote dilution, does not have palpable or meaningful
costs. Of course, even if there are such costs, they would have to be compared
against the benefits of selective abandonment of compactness, but Shaw's
critics often simply deny that the kinds of costs Shaw recognizes can be
meaningful. To test this view, consider another traditional districting norm
closely related to compactness: contiguity. If concerns for compactness should
not constrain at all the pursuit of enhanced minority representation, why not
abandon contiguity as well? For example, North Carolina's District 12
connected several major urban areas via the narrow corridor of a highway. For
those not troubled by the extreme noncompactness of this district, suppose
North Carolina had abandoned the pretense of contiguity altogether0 9 and
not bothered to connect these islands of urban black populations via the thin
highway corridor. Suppose a state simply declared that to enhance minority
representation (or for any other purpose), a particular congressional district
would consist of certain population islands scattered throughout the state. Is
selectively abandoning contiguity in this way different in kind from the
departure from compactness in Shaw itself? It is hard to see why: "Island
districting" is the next logical extension of what North Carolina actually did.
Indeed, it might simply be more candid, thus minimizing the concerns for
hypocrisy: The thin corridors connecting the urban populations in District 12
existed largely as a veneer to maintain the appearance of contiguity. If the
image of selective "island districts" in a landscape of contiguous districts gives
one pause, what lies behind this resistance will be a sense of genuine social
costs associated with selective districting practices employed for particular
ends.
If island districting would generate such harms, formally contiguous
districts that deviate dramatically from relative compactness would seem to
implicate precisely the same harms. There seems little difference in principle,
or likely social perceptions, between island districts and extremely bizarre
ones; the two differ less in kind than in degree. Yet that no one has seriously
proposed (as far as I am aware) a redistricting plan with selective island
districts, for racial or other purposes, suggests the force of the norms that keep
such districts off limits. The existence of those norms reflects a recognition
that there are genuine costs associated with such deviations from the
conventional norms of territorial districting. In this respect, island districts and
Shaw districts do not seem sharply different. Both constitute highly visible
abandonments of basic landmarks readily associated with territorial districting.
If the reliance on landmarks of this sort seems highly formal,"' much of the
109. Indeed, by some accounts, District 12 was not in fact entirely contiguous. See Grofman, supra
note 103, at 1263 n.106.
110. For a critique of Shaw along these lines, see Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race:
Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1843 (1994).
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law and the structure of social norms are organized around just such
formalisms.
Compactness does vary in degree, whereas contiguity either exists or is
absent. Thus a quantum decrease in compactness might not be as
psychologically salient as a complete break in contiguity. While there seems
to be some truth to this insight, particularly when dealing with marginal
deviations from compactness, the more important point to focus on is whether
the rupture of contiguity--especially for selective ends--seems to implicate
meaningful concerns. If so, it does not seem difficult to conclude that at least
comparably extreme deviations from compactness would raise similar costs.
The question then becomes not whether deviations from compactness can
impose meaningful harms, but at just what point those harms arise.
Should the prospect of selective island districts still fail to generate a sense
of genuine social costs, then consider the next possible variation: "postcard
districting." Suppose a state, to enhance minority representation or for other
purposes, mailed postcards identifying the districts into which those with the
power to decide had chosen to place various voters."' Suppose most districts
were conventionally compact and contiguous, except for this postcard district.
Perhaps at this point we reach a form of "districting" that differs in kind, not
just degree, from island districting and extremely bizarre geographic districts.
Or for some readers, perhaps not. The point is that at one stage or another in
the variations in degree on Shaw-type districting, one suspects most readers
will recognize that the selective and highly visible manipulation of territorial
districting norms for particular ends, even worthy ones, does impose genuine
social costs. If logical extensions of the redistricting practices on display in
Shaw make it easier to see that there are meaningful costs at stake, they help
reveal that it is too easy to dismiss Shaw as addressing only fanciful or
imagined harms.
I mean this point to be a minimal one, responsive only to the strongest
critiques of Shaw on this point. The myth here is that only actual vote dilution
is a meaningful and recognizable social and political harm, and that the
selective manipulation of territorial districting in highly visible ways simply
cannot impose "expressive harms" that are worth taking into account. But the
districting at issue in Shaw surely has costs as well as benefits, whatever the
ultimate calculus might be. The concerns that Shaw raises regarding the
expressive harms from such practices cannot be dismissed as of no weight.
Further debates about Shaw's concern for expressive harms move into the
pragmatic and normative realm where talk of mythologies is no longer
appropriate. The more moderate version of the expressive-harms critique
111. When I posed this idea in class, an otherwise quiet white student boiled over with rage and
explained that she was a partner in an interracial marriage; she found horribly offensive the idea that the
state could place her and her husband in separate voting dismcts for any purpose, including enhancing
minority representation.
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recognizes that there might be genuine costs associated with this kind of
districting, but treats those costs as worth bearing for the gains in minority
representation. This opens an appropriate debate about how the competing
values at stake ought to be assessed. Similarly, even if distortions of the
districting system at some point do generate the harms Shaw identifies, the
question remains whether Shaw draws the line at the right point. From a
pragmatic perspective, further questions arise as to whether courts have the
institutional tools to draw and enforce this kind of line, a question this Essay
addresses in Part II. From a related, legal perspective, there are questions as
to whether enforcement of the norms of territorial districting ought to be
pursued through constitutional law as opposed to other means. These are
important questions to ask about Shaw, but meaningful engagement with them
is frustrated rather than furthered by simply dismissing the view that social
costs, whatever their weight in an ultimate social calculus, follow from the
selective abandonment of conventional districting norms.
To set the issue of "expressive harms" in a broader context, Shaw
problems arise today because American voting policy currently seeks to
accomplish two inconsistent aims through territorial districting. Most western
democracies have avoided this inconsistency by opting for systems based
principally on proportional representation. By organizing elections around
geographic districts, we seek to make representation turn on geographically
defined concerns. With the VRA, we seek to define representation in terms of
the political interests of specific groups, such as protected minorities. Some
accommodation can be made between these two ways of conceiving
representation and defining political identity, but the two cannot readily be
made congruent. We are currently trying to wedge the concerns of an interest-
based approach into a geographically based system; at some point, the tension
between the two reaches a breaking point. Criticism of Shaw that rests on an
assumption that any means necessary to enhance minority representation should
be adopted is, ultimately, an argument that concerns for interest representation
should completely trump a geographically defined system of representation.
Maybe so; but abandoning that geographic system selectively, in only those
cases concerning racial and ethnic representation, is quite different from
abandoning that system altogether."2
E. Understanding the Context of Shaw
I have offered four points in an effort to understand Shaw on its own
terms. Neither singly nor jointly do these points justify Shaw, nor are they
112. Bernard Grofman, a strong supporter of the VRA, once asked in the title of an article condemning
North Carolina District 12 whether race is "'the only thing.'" Grofman, supra note 103, at 1237 (quoting
and analogizing to Vince Lombardi's football maxim). That question captures the problem of selectively
abandoning geography in extreme ways for selected purposes.
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meant to. But they do suggest that seeing Shaw in fundamental ideological
terms makes critique too easy. First, districts in the 1990s became more
bizarrely shaped through a complex of interrelated forces. Second, Congress
cannot be portrayed as having made a deliberative decision, or any decision at
all, to endorse the kind of districts at issue in cases such as Shaw. Third,
serious judicial concern with race-conscious districting, particularly in extreme
forms, has been a continuous theme of the last thirty years of judicial
confrontation with this issue. Fourth, at some point, genuine "expressive
harms" might legitimately be thought to arise from the highly visible political
manipulation of electoral structures, particularly when done selectively for
racial purposes." 3
That Shaw is a response to novel circumstances, or that certain criticisms
of it are insufficient, does not mean that the specific principles it announces
will be easily implemented. Indeed, if some of the Court's critics fail to
appreciate the distinctness of redistricting compared to other areas of race-
conscious policymaking, Shaw itself can be said to make this same mistake
when it comes to developing doctrinal principles that address the "expressive
harms" with which Shaw is concerned. In Part II, I argue that the Court's
"predominant motive" test reflects confusion about the extent to which
redistricting can be approached through the same legal framework as race-
conscious policies in other areas the Court has confronted. The "predominant
motive" test turns out to be neither conceptually appropriate nor practically
implementable in the context of Shaw's concerns about racial redistricting. In
Part III, I suggest the path future implementation of Shaw is more likely,
explicitly or implicitly, to take.
II. THE FAILINGS OF THE MOTIVE-BASED APPROACH
Last Term's cases more deeply entrench the principle, stated simply at
first, that strict scrutiny is required when race has been "the predominant factor
motivating the legislature's [redistricting] decision.""' Once this motive
threshold is crossed, districts are justified only if narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling interest. Currently, all Justices have been willing to assume that
compliance with section 2 or 5 of the VRA constitutes a compelling interest,
indeed, perhaps the only one." 5
113. To take these costs seriously is not to conclude that they outwcigh the gais in minority
representation.
114. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1951-52 (1996) (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). This
principle was announced in Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475. 2490 (1995). the first case to attempt to
lend more doctrinal precision to the cause of action recognized in Shaw.
115. States might seek to engage in remedial race-conscious distncung beyond that which the VRA
requires. For an argument that the early Shaw cases can be read to permit this. see Bnfrault. supra note
19, at 77-79. In Bush, the Court requires any such race-conscious redtstrcting to meet two standards. (I)
the discrimination must be specific and identified; (2) "the State must have had a strong basis in evidence
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This simple statement, however, must be further unpacked. The motive test
comes in a strong and a weak form. Several Justices have adopted the strong
form: Strict scrutiny is required whenever the legislature intentionally creates
a majority-minority district that "would not have existed but for the express
use of racial classifications." ' 16 Yet the Court as a whole has embraced only
a weaker form of the motive test. Justice O'Connor is explicit that a state can
intentionally create majority-minority districts and "may otherwise" take race
into consideration without triggering strict scrutiny, as long as the state does
"not subordinate traditional districting criteria to the use of race for its own
sake or as a proxy.""' 7 Thus, on this weak form, intent is critical when the
state has subordinated traditional districting criteria; otherwise, intent matters
not at all.
From the start, this on-off quality of the intent test should signal something
incongruous. In no other constitutional area is intent discontinuously relevant.
To implement Shaw, I believe, the Court will have to go one step beyond even
the weak form of the intent test and abandon giving intent any significant role.
In the current cases, the Court exhausts enormous energy in purporting to
determine "the predominant motive" behind a majority-minority district, but,
as I will show, to no real end. Not only should the Court abandon this primary
focus on intent, but it will inevitably have to do so. The "predominant motive"
standard: (1) fails to fit the harms at stake to appropriate principles for
identifying their occurrence; (2) reflects a continuing misconceived effort to
apply individual-rights approaches to expressive harms that necessarily require
a different model; and (3) cannot be administered intelligibly because in the
redistricting arena the question it asks is fundamentally unanswerable.
to conclude that remedial action was necessary, before it embarks on an affirmative action program." 116
S. Ct. at 1962-63 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court then notes
that those conditions, as presented by appellants, are tantamount to establishing vote dilution and racially
polarized voting--that is, a section 2 violation. See id. at 1963 (plurality opinion). Thus the Court says that
these concerns are the same as those that underlie section 2, and, the Court further concludes, these
concerns are therefore valid only when section 2 would be violated. In light of this analysis, it is not easy
to see how race-conscious districting could satisfy strict scrutiny when the VRA is not violated. See supra
note 19 (discussing Briffault's proposal).
Interestingly, the Court's apparent position is one Justice Brennan suggested in the Court's first
confrontation with racial redistricting. Justice Brennan was prepared to find such districting constitutional,
but only where Congress had specifically decided upon such a national policy. Thus, unlike the plurality,
Justice Brennan was not prepared to express a view about race-conscious districting beyond this point.
Compare United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (plurality opinion), with id. at 175 (Brennan,
J., concurring) ("However the Court ultimately decides the constitutional legitimacy of 'reverse
discrimination' pure and simple, I am convinced that the application of the Voting Rights Act substantially
minimizes the objections to preferential treatment, and legitimates the use of even overt, numerical racial
devices in electoral redistricting.").
116. Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1973 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Strict scrutiny applies to all governmental
classifications based on race.., there is no exception for race-based redistricting."). Justice Kennedy has
not endorsed this standard quite so directly, but his opinions are easily read to do so. See generally id. at
1971 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (intimating that strict scrutiny is required "whenever a State, in redistricting,
foreordains that one race be the majority in a certain number of districts or in a certain part of the State").
117. Id. at 1969 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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A. The Mismatch Between Expressive Harms and the "Predominant Motive"
Test
From the conceptual start, the intent test is flawed because it does not fit
the kinds of harms that Shaw makes actionable. In Shaw itself, the Court
offered numerous, occasionally conflicting, descriptions of these harms. In
some, the harm was portrayed as an injury to the specific individuals or
representatives in the particular district;itS in others, the harm lay in the
social perceptions and generalized messages that certain districts conveyed." 9
Litigators sometimes seized on the former descriptions and sought futilely to
prove in subsequent cases that no plaintiff suffered any of these district-
specific harms." ° Not surprisingly, this strategy failed; the Court has now
made clear that the fundamental constitutional problem is that certain districts
"convey the message that political identity is, or should be, predominantly
racial."' 2' As the Court now forthrightly says, Shaw addresses expressive
harms. Shaw is therefore concerned with the social perceptions and
understandings conveyed by extreme districting practices. This is a concern
with the character of the political culture constructed when race is used in
excessive and unjustified ways. This point is critical to understanding Shaw:
The doctrine does not address violations of individual rights in any traditional
sense, but rather addresses the political culture itself.'22
If social messages and perceptions are the concern of Shaw, how should
Shaw be applied? The weak form of the intent test requires judges to engage
118. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993) (describing pernicious message that racially
gerrymandered districts send to representatives and finding racial gerrymanders harmful because. in voting.
"'the individual is important, not his race'") (quoting Wright v Rockefeller. 376 U S 52. 66 (1963)
(Douglas, J., dissenting)).
119. See id. at 647 ("[Racial gerrymanderingl reinforces the percpuon that members of the same
racial group ... think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the
polls."); see also id. at 650 (describing harm in terms of how it is -understood'" and message it
"reinforces").
120. See Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 471-72 & n.59 (E D.N C. 1994) (rejecting evidence as
irrelevant), rev'd on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996); Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All 77tese
Years: Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CutiB. L. REV. 287. 295-96 (1996)
121. Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1961 (plurality opinion).
122. For a further analysis of this point, see Richard H. Pildes, Two Conceptions of Rights in Cases
of Political "Rights", 34 Hotus. L. REV. (forthcoming Summer 1997). If this seems at all odd. consider a
state policy to ration gas, as in prior energy crises, in which black drivers would have access to gas on
some days, white drivers on others. I assume this explicit but noninvtdious racial classification would be
unconstitutional because administrative convenience would not be a sufficiently compelling state interest-
If so, equal protection doctrine here would similarly be concerned with the character of political culture,
and not with deprivations of individual rights. See. e g., Charles R Lawrence Ill. If He Hollers Let Him
Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus. 1990 DUKE LJ 431. 439-63.
For these reasons, the standing rules that attach to Shaw claims, which permit only those within
bizarrely shaped race-conscious districts to sue, are difficult to justify. See Samuel Issacharoff & Thomas
C. Goldstein, Identifying the Harm in Racial Gerronandering Cases, I MicH J RACE & L 47 (1996).
Karlan, supra note 120, at 289-300; Pildes & Niemi, supra note 6. at 513-16 Given the expressive hams
recognized, a more apt standing principle would grant standing to any resident of the state, or perhaps to
anyone at all. That a standing rule of this breadth might appear unorthodox only confirms that the kinds
of harms Shaw recognizes are themselves constitutionally less familiar
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in exquisitely detailed inquiries into the multitude of motivations behind the
creation of a bizarrely shaped minority district. The ultimate touchstone,
supposedly, is whether race was the "predominant factor" among these various
motivations. Even assuming this an intelligible question, which it is not, what
reason exists to believe an answer would be relevant to the social perceptions
that trouble Shaw? I suggest there are none.
The redistricting process includes many steps that take place off the public
stage. Not until litigation discovery and days of trial testimony do the details
of the process become known. Even then, it takes trial judges lengthy hearings
and extensive findings to purport to reach conclusions on "the predominant
motive" for a district. When these cases reach the Supreme Court, the Justices
spend inordinate amounts of energy debating the question, only to come to
opposing conclusions. In ordinary intent cases, none of this matters because the
doctrine is concerned with distinguishing actions genuinely motivated by
different reasons. In employment cases, for example, the Court must determine
whether an employee was fired for racial reasons or reasons going to job
performance. Because Shaw is fundamentally concerned with social
perceptions, the public dimensions of redistricting must be doctrinally central
in ways not relevant to ordinary intent cases. Yet these social perceptions
cannot possibly turn on whether, at the end of this litigative process, race can
be said to have been "the predominant factor." Because Shaw is not concerned
with traditional individual rights, but with social messages and perceptions, the
doctrine needs to be tailored to the factors most central to constructing those
social perceptions.
Judicial opinions in these cases, as well as editorial pages, reprint maps of
the districts, not transcripts of political processes, for a reason.'23 Social
perceptions about the "excessive" role of race are more likely attuned to
objective characteristics of districts, such as their shapes, rather than the
mysteries of intent. As Justice O'Connor has said, bizarre shape "is not merely
evidentially significant; it is part of the constitutional problem insofar as it
disrupts nonracial bases of political identity and thus intensifies the emphasis
on race."'" That statement is well-suited to the kind of constitutional injuries
Shaw, rightly or wrongly, recognizes. Highly bizarre districts are the problem,
not intent, because it is objective circumstances such as district shapes, if
anything, that "convey the message that political identity is, or should be,
predominantly racial."' 5
The Court would do better to acknowledge this directly, abandon the
"predominant motive" search, and recognize the relatively unimportant role of
intent, even in its weaker form, in these cases. What would result? Strict
123. I am indebted to my research assistant, Jeff Fisher, for this way of articulating the point.
124. Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1962 (plurality opinion).
125. Id. (plurality opinion).
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scrutiny would be triggered simply by majority-minority districts that departed
unreasonably from traditional districting practices. (The standards for
"unreasonable" and "traditional" must be defined in the Court's current test,
so the difficulty of doing so cannot count against this formulation.)'2 Indeed,
some lower courts are already applying essentially this approach; thus, as one
three-judge district court concluded in holding that strict scrutiny had to be
applied to a black-majority congressional district in Florida, "one does not
need to look any further than a map of the Third District to reach the
conclusion that race was in fact the predominant motivating factor [of the
redistricting body].""1 7 Moreover, as with the weak form of the intent
standard that the Court currently employs, majority-minority districts drawn
consistently with these traditional practices would not require strict scrutiny,
no matter how race-conscious their design. That is, the current doctrine does
not lead to the triggering of strict scrutiny even if the redistricting authorities
announce in the most public way that their overwhelming motive was to create
a minority-controlled district, as long as the means they employ do not
subordinate traditional districting practices. Better to make that principle as
clear as possible.
In addition to conceptual clarity, relinquishing the pretense of inquiry into
intent would have several benefits. First, the Court's formulation sends
confused signals to redistricters when clear standards are critical. For example,
Shaw is going to be applied too broadly to the extent that redistricters
mistakenly believe it condemns any race-conscious intent, especially given that
self-interested political actors will exploit any ambiguity in the doctrine. Broad
language about intent invites such misreadings. It also invites courts to
examine individual segments of a district, such as a protruding "arm," to
determine whether that particular component was predominantly motivated by
a race-conscious decision to bring more minority voters into the district. If the
conclusion to that question is yes, courts are likely to conclude that the district
as a whole results from these motivations. That result is not necessarily
compelled as a logical matter, but as lower-court application of Shaw reveals,
it is difficult for courts to find specific district components to reflect this
motivation without then attributing that aim to the design of the district as a
whole. As will be noted in a moment, part of the intractability of attributing
predominant motives to election-district designs is that they are the product of
hundreds of smaller decisions about where to locate specific lines.' 3 The
Court's current language about "predominant motives" is likely to be divorced
in application (most predictably by political actors but also perhaps by lower
126. The normative question of the legitimacy of these baselnes is more a question of whether Shi
itself is right-a question I defer here--than it is an argument as to how best to implement Shmu,
127. Johnson v. Mortham, 915 F. Supp. 1529. 1550 (N.D Fla. 1995).
128. For what might be considered one illustration of this phenomenon. see Moon v Meadows. No
3:95CV942, 1997 WL 57432 (E.D. Va. 1997).
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courts) from the Court's qualification that this motive must subordinate
traditional districting criteria 29 before strict scrutiny is triggered. In other
words, the Court's weak form of the intent standard might well become
transformed in redistricting practice into the strong form of the intent test that
the Court has actually rejected. Doctrine that focused more centrally on
specifying clear rules about what constituted a departure from traditional
districting practices, such that strict scrutiny would be triggered, would be less
susceptible to the kind of overbroad application that Shaw invites.
Second, as the current cases demonstrate, a doctrinal standard centered on
intent necessarily invites prolonged and costly litigation. In and of itself, that
would not be so troubling, except for a third problem: At the end of the day,
the inquiry into intent is actually pointless. I can envision no case in which a
highly bizarre majority-minority district would not trigger strict scrutiny, given
the way the Court applies its "predominant motive" test. If so, better to
acknowledge that fact directly. That such a district would arise without some
degree of race-conscious intent seems unlikely. In an area with a concentrated
black population, a reasonably compact, traditionally shaped district could,
conceivably, arise without race-conscious design. In one scenario, that intent
would be the exclusive motivation for the district; hence, strict scrutiny would
apply. In the only other scenario, the more likely one, the motivations would
be some mix of partisan-race-incumbent concerns analogous to those in last
Term's cases. As I will argue shortly, in such circumstances there is no
intelligible way to determine which motive is "predominant." Yet the doctrine
requires the Court to purport to do so. This Term, the Court has made clear
how it will attribute t30 a "predominant motive" in these circumstances: by
judging whether too extreme a departure from traditional districting practices
has taken place. In other words, intent plays no independent role in the
analysis: Shape and other attributes of the districts themselves determine
attributions of intent. When bizarrely shaped minority districts arise, judicial
findings on "intent" and "predominant motive" will necessarily follow from the
judgment of whether traditional districting principles have been violated. That
much is now clear from last Term's cases. If so, there is no reason not to hold
expressly and candidly that it is the violation of those principles that triggers
strict scrutiny, not intent. The effort to import intent doctrines from other areas
129. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
130. Below, I argue that there is no intelligible way to weigh internally the roles of race versus
partisan versus other motivations. The Court must necessarily assign "predominant" motive on the basis
of some external attribution; namely, that when this mix of motives is present, and traditional districting
principles are abandoned, the Court will conclude that its intent standard has been violated. In this respect,
a "predominant motive" test here is no different from the problems of proximate causation in any other area
of law, morals, or policy; conclusions about proximate causation do not inhere in physical facts alone, but
depend on external, collective attributions of responsibility. See, e.g., MARION SMILEY, MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BOUNDARIES OF COMMUNITY 11 (1992) ("[The causal responsibility of an
individual for external harm is relative to a variety of social and political considerations over which
individuals themselves have no control.").
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of equal protection law is confused and unnecessary. Far better, then, to
abandon the primary and extensive emphasis on intent and "predominant
motives."
To be sure, there is a certain minimal or formal sense of race-
consciousness that will have to continue to be an aspect of Shaw-type cases.
As an interpretation of the Equal Protection clause, Shaw addresses only
bizarre districting that implicates race. But all minority-controlled districts do
so, in the sense that all almost certainly result from a process in which this
effect of the districting process is not only foreseeable but intended and
desired. Surely there is no current minority-controlled district whose geography
is extremely bizarre, the only kind of district to which Shaw's strict scrutiny
standard applies, about which this statement is false. My contention is that any
further inquiry into intent and predominant motives distracts courts and sends
confusing signals to redistricters. Under Shaw, those minority districts that
subordinate traditional districting practices trigger strict scrutiny, while those
that adhere to such practices do not. Rather than organizing judicial analysis
around any further search for "predominant motives," courts would do more
to further the principled implementation of Shaw by working at giving content
to the mixed historical and normative issue of "traditional districting practices."
B. Expressive Harms and the Inapplicability of the Individual-Rights Model
I have suggested already several reasons why Shaw cannot be understood
through the lens of traditional individual rights. I will add only one further
point here. If the problem with the kind of racial classifications at issue in
Shaw is that they deprive individuals of rights in the classic sense, this
principle ought to apply whenever any individual is affected by a racial
classification in redistricting. In the employment context, where the Davis
standard that Shaw imports was developed, any person to whom the state
denies ajob for racially discriminatory reasons has a valid constitutional claim.
If Shaw actually means that the mere fact of being classified by race violates
individual rights, any individual so classified similarly would have a valid
constitutional claim.
Yet we know that Shaw does not apply to racial classification per se: It
does not apply when, for example, such classifications are used consistently
with traditional districting practices. Beyond this, Shaw does not seem likely
to apply even to all contexts in which nontraditional districting employs
explicit racial classifications. For example, suppose race-conscious redistricters
decide to increase the black population of an irregular district, but not to the
point of creating a majority-black district. The black population of a district
might be raised from 15% to 30% "for racial purposes," to increase the
electoral influence of the black population, or "for partisan purposes," to
enhance Democratic prospects by using race as a proxy. If the Shaw doctrine
19971 2543
The Yale Law Journal
actually operated within traditional individual rights models, these racial
classifications would presumably violate it. With respect to the "rights" of the
individuals being classified, both black and white district residents, it should
make no difference whether 1 or 300,000 people (roughly the number needed
to make a typical district 55% black in population) are affected. As the Court
has said, the rights recognized by the Fourteenth Amendment are "guaranteed
to the individual" and are "personal rights."''
Conceivably, the Court could extend Shaw this far, but this seems
unlikely.'32 The Shaw doctrine likely will continue to address racial
classifications only when they lead to majority-minority districts. What
distinguishes these districts from the hypothetical district is not that one
involves racial classification and the other does not. Nor is it that one violates
individual rights and the other does not. The difference is that only extremely
bizarre majority-minority districts are such publicly visible, identifiable
symbols, in the Court's view, of "excessive" uses of race. Once again, the fact
that Shaw is concerned with social perceptions and expressive harms cannot
be avoided. Shaw does not recognize any individual right against excessive
racial classification, its own language notwithstanding; the expressive harms
it does recognize cannot be addressed within doctrinal frameworks anchored
in more traditional individual rights frameworks. The Court, however, has not
yet fully accepted this conclusion. Given the subtlety and novelty of the
"expressive harms" idea, it is perhaps not surprising that the Court should shift
back and forth between accepting it on its own terms and trying, instead, to
force Shaw into the more traditional individual-rights model. However, that
model's inapplicability is another reason to drop the "predominant motive"
test. The test reflects the importation into redistricting of a rights-oriented
doctrinal approach that badly fits the Shaw cause of action.'33
131. Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
132. The Supreme Court has agreed to hear a case this Term in which one of the questions raised does
indeed present such a challenge. In the initial redistricting of the Florida Senate, in which both the state
legislature and supreme court played a role, one district (Florida Senate District 21) emerged with a
majority-minority population in a "region" in which the minority population is substantially less than a
majority. In subsequent proceedings, that district was reduced to a black voting-age population of 36.2%.
Nonetheless, the appellant has continued to press the challenge that because the relevant "region" has only
an 8% black voting-age population, the construction of this 36.2% district violates Miller. See Brief for
Appellant at i, 13, 41-42, Scott v. United States Dep't of Justice, 920 F. Supp. 1248 (M.D. Fla.), prob.
juris. noted sub nom. Lawyer v. United States Dep't of Justice, 117 S. Ct. 292 (1996) (No. 95-2024). The
Court might avoid reaching this question, however, because the method under which the district was crafted
also raises significant constitutional questions; the district court had ordered mediation without finding the
original district unconstitutional or seeking approval from the state legislature. See id.; Scott, 920 F. Supp.
at 1250-56 (describing mediation). If the Court rules that the mediation process itself was unconstitutional,
the Shaw challenge to an "influence" district rather than a minority-controlled district would not need to
be addressed.
133. Note the general difficulty that the Court has in accepting that vote dilution and Shaw claims do
not involve individual rights, but the group distribution of political power. This difficulty is further reflected
in the Court's argument in Shaw v. Hunt that any remedy for racial vote dilution under section 2 of the
VRA must be confined "to the area" where the injury occurs. See Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1906
(1996). The Court justifies this conclusion by rejecting the view that the right to an undiluted vote "belongs
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C. The Unintelligibility of the "Predominant Motive" Test
The final critique of the "predominant motive" test already has been raised
in incisive dissenting opinions and academic commentary."' The problem is
that this dominant motive question cannot be answered meaningfully in the
redistricting context. I want to add one point to what has been said elsewhere.
In the other contexts from which the Court draws the predominant motive
test, typically at issue is one specific decision. For example, a job has been
denied, a contract has been let to a competing bidder, an application for a
zoning variance has been turned down. In contrast, the decision of where to
locate the boundaries of an election district implicates literally hundreds of
more individualized decisions. Moreover, the mix of partisan and racial
considerations, and the further internal interrelationship between the two,
makes a predominant motive test that seeks to isolate the contribution of racial
considerations all the more unwieldy. This intertwining of race and politics has
at least two implications for constraints on redistricting. First, it is often
unrealistic to act as if the two aims can be disentangled and one assigned
predominance. Second, even if these aims could be distinguished, many of the
criticisms of race-consciousness that lead to extreme forms of districting could
also be levelled at partisan goals that contribute to such districting. If the Court
is going to develop constitutional constraints on excessive manipulations of the
districting system, it would be more manageable, more consistent with the way
motives mix complexly in this area, and leave the Court less open to charges
of selective concern for the integrity of territorial districting were the Court to
develop more general and universal constraints on district manipulation.
Constraints that took the form of more general principles would necessarily
focus less on searching for specific motives and more on specifying objective
limitations on how far district manipulation could go, with less concern for
judgments about the reasons driving it.
to the minority as a group and not to its individual members It does not." Id. But that effort to recast vote
dilution litigation in terms of individual rights simply cannot be sustained analytically Vote dilution
necessarily refers to the ways in which the votes of individuals are aggregated through electoral structures;
it necessarily focuses on the distribution of political power between competing groups Indeed. the concept
has been criticized for this very reason. See Larry Alexander. Lost ti tire Political 77Tcket. 41 FLA L REV
563 (1989). It is black voters as a group that have their voting power diluted vis--vrs white voters as a
group. There might be various reasons to limit state redistricting authorities. responding to Department of
Justice objections, to drawing reasonably compact minority districts in the geographic region that forms the
basis for the Department's refusal to preclear. But preservation of individual rights of black voters cannot
logically be among those reasons.
134. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 19, at 67-71; Samuel Issacharoff. 77e Constitutional Contours of
Race and Politics, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 45, 57 ("Unfortunately. by turning to tort-like concepts of causation.
the Court is taking a difficult and unresolved area of constitutional law and saddling it with a segment of
the common law that has been caustically termed the 'last refuge of muddy thinkers ') (citation omitted).
Karlan, supra note 120, at 305 (commenting that predominant motive test "is as doctrinally confused as
it is confusing"); Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson. Why %tbng is Different. 84 CAL L REV 1201
(1996).
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To appreciate both the intractability of a predominant motive test for
redistricting and the way any such test is likely to be applied in practice,
assume initially that it is possible with respect to any one specific line-location
decision to say that one factor motivated it exclusively. One line was drawn
for partisan reasons; another was drawn to protect constituencies of the
existing officeholder; still another, to raise the percentage of minority voters;
still others, to respect the demands of incumbents in adjoining districts. Even
if we could assign a single pure or dominant motive to the drawing of any one
particular line, how would we assign a dominant motive to the location of the
district as a whole? Should we assign a motive to each discrete line-location
decision, then aggregate them quantitatively to see which motivation accounts
for the largest number of specific decisions? Or should we try to assess how
many people in the district actually were affected by each specific line-location
decision, add these up, and then treat as predominant the motive that affected
the largest number of residents? Should it be the motive that appeared to be
most important to those with political power, that is, the goal they were least
willing to compromise? Or should it be the motives chronologically addressed
first in the sequence of redistricting, as the cases sometimes seem to suggest?
In other words, even if we could treat each specific line-location decision
as resting on one exclusive motive whose role we could know with certainty,
there still seems no intelligible way to determine the "predominant motive" for
the design of an election district. As Richard Briffault points out, it is
unrealistic to treat even discrete line-location decisions as stemming from one
exclusive motivation.'35 Any one decision can itself reflect a complex mix
of racial, partisan, and candidate-specific considerations. As soon as the
redistricting problem is confronted on its own terms, the intractability of trying
to determine the predominant motive for the location of a district becomes
readily apparent.
How, then, will the Court determine such questions? Inevitably, the Court
will have to attribute a predominant motive based on certain extrinsic
circumstances. That is, in actual practice the Court will implicitly define
specific extrinsic constraints, the violation of which will be deemed to make
racial purposes "the predominant motive." Once again, these extrinsic
conditions will include considerations such as how compact the district is; how
much it respects preexisting political units; how much its borders track natural
geographic boundaries, and the like. Again, the Court would do better to do
explicitly what it will necessarily have to do implicitly: focus on giving content
to these extrinsic constraints directly.
In sum, the "predominant motive" test fails to identify when the expressive
harms with which Shaw is concerned actually occur; the test stems from an
135. See Briffault, supra note 19, at 51 ("The real difficulty in applying [the Court's] racial-motivation
test will be determining what counts as a racial motive.").
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individual rights model that is unsuited to addressing the kind of injuries Shaw
recognizes; and the test cannot be administered intelligibly. Given the
principles underlying Shaw and the distinction the Shaw doctrine tries to
maintain between "appropriate and reasonable necessary" and "unjustified and
excessive"' 116 uses of race in the context of redistricting, the Court would best
implement these principles by abandoning the pretense of inquiry into intent
altogether.
Indeed, there is some evidence the Court is already doing exactly this,
although without expressly acknowledging so. Thus the Court has affirmed
summarily a redistricting plan for California's state legislative districts that was
drawn by a panel of special masters. 137 The special masters' report had been
explicit that race and ethnicity had been the predominant motive behind the
drawing of several districts, but the special masters also asserted that these
districts were reasonably compact and otherwise complied with traditional
districting principles. The special masters thus interpreted Shaw to mean that
race-conscious intent was permissible as long as traditional districting
principles were otherwise complied with. Should the Court's summary
affirmance turn out to signal acceptance of that approach, it would make clear
that the most explicit race-conscious intent in designing districts would not
make them unconstitutional, notwithstanding Miller's "predominant motive"
principle. This summary affirmance in DeWitt might well be the best indication
of how the Court will apply Shaw in the coming years.
III. THE FUTURE OF SHAW
In developing legal constraints on the districting process, courts have only
a few options. The most basic divide is between approaches that focus on
electoral outcomes versus those that focus on the processes through which
districts are created. With respect to concerns about partisan manipulation, for
example, an outcome-oriented approach could hinge on whether the number
of seats a party received in a state's overall congressional delegation
adequately mirrored that party's statewide vote total. Such seats/vote ratios put
primary emphasis on electoral outcomes. While precise proportionality would
be at odds with the concept of districting itself, if Republicans in
Massachusetts receive 35% of the statewide vote but no congressional seats,
the effects of the districting might be treated as sufficiently egregious as to
amount to a partisan gerrymander. With respect to Shaw's concern about race,
however, such outcome-oriented measures do not seem available. It would be
easy to envision such measures if the goal were ensuring adequate levels of
minority officeholding in the sense of descriptive representation; rough
136. See supra note 18.
137. See Dewiu v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994). aff'd. 115 S Ci 2637 (1995)
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proportionality between representatives and the population they represent
would be an obvious baseline. Yet there is no similar baseline centered on
election outcomes to enforce Shaw's concern about the "excessive use of race."
Process approaches can be subdivided into at least three distinct forms.
The first is the kind of intent-based doctrine reflected in the Court's current
"predominant motive" test. For the reasons I have offered, I do not believe
such an approach is promising, nor do I believe it best describes what the
Court is actually doing in post-Shaw cases. A second process approach would
focus on requiring redistricters to articulate publicly the factors that will govern
the process and the relative weight those factors will be given.'38 An
advantage of this approach is that it requires generality in policymaking that
in and of itself can constrain the play of factors like special treatment for
powerful incumbents. Once redistricters must precommit to particular policies,
their ability to manipulate those policies could be diminished. As a general
matter, the problem with such an approach is that the factors relevant to
redistricting are typically defined in such general and vague terms, and enough
factors are considered legitimate or relevant, that redistricters would be left
with just as much discretion as they have already.
Aspects of recent post-Shaw cases suggest that Court is partly drawn to
this kind of approach. When the Court criticizes the fact that computerized
redistricting programs contain more fine-grained data on race than any other
variable,'3 9 it is suggesting that race not be the kind of criteria, or at least not
so "excessively," upon which redistricters can rely publicly. This approach is
even more strongly manifested in Vera's thinly developed twist to the Shaw
doctrine, namely that "race cannot be a proxy" for other considerations (even
when the correlation is extremely high). Pushed to its limits, this doctrine
would seek to extirpate any direct invocation of race from the process. At least
two problems make this form of process constraint seem implausible. First, it
might only drive reliance on race underground. Redistricters cannot be denied
their prior demographic knowledge-for instance, that congressional districts
centered on Detroit will have higher black populations than those in the
surrounding northern suburbs. Second, and more importantly, such an approach
is difficult to square with Shaw's claim to seek to distinguish appropriate from
excessive uses of race. This kind of approach would work best for factors
courts would be prepared to hold have no legitimate role in redistricting. Given
138. For the development of such an approach, see Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive
Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1643, 1698-1702 (1993).
139. For example, as the court noted in Bush:
[The computer program used in redistricting Texas' congressional delegation] contained racial
data at the block-by-block level, whereas other data, such as party registration and past voting
statistics, were only available at the level of voter tabulation districts (which approximate
election precincts). The availability and use of block-by-block racial data was
unprecedented ....
Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1953 (1996) (plurality opinion).
2548 [Vol. 106: 2505
Pildes
the more nuanced line Shaw seeks to draw, this approach becomes more
problematic.
The third process approach appears the most plausible, in light of Shaw's
stated concerns. Judicial doctrine can seek to specify extrinsic and relatively
more objective constraints on the design of districts. Rather than focusing on
electoral outcomes, intent, or efforts to eliminate one factor from the process
altogether, the Court could seek to define the outer boundaries on the ways
districts are constitutionally permitted to be manipulated. To be sure, this
would be a dramatic change in constitutional doctrine, though perhaps less
dramatic than earlier judicial interventions, such as the one-vote, one-person
doctrine. Yet once the Court is prepared to police the process of redistricting
other than to vindicate palpable harms to individual rights, such interventions
might become inevitable.
It is unlikely that the Court will expressly state that Shaw is to be
implemented through judicial development of constitutionally based extrinsic
constraints on district design. Yet in practice, this is the most likely end point
as Shaw becomes operationalized. The failings of the intent doctrine, and the
institutional pressures that push courts to seek judicially administrable
doctrines, will propel the courts in practice, if not in formal doctrine, to begin
specifying extrinsic, judicially imposed constraints on the creation of majority-
minority districts. Justice Souter has rightly argued that this is the only
"nonrevolutionary" way to give principled content to Shaw."'' As noted
above, there are signs already that this is the way the Court is implementing
Shaw, even if it does not acknowledge so expressly.
I cannot provide a detailed blueprint here for what those doctrines would
look like. In general terms, the courts will give more specific content to
requirements focused on the objective circumstances of districting: that districts
140. See id. at 2010 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The Court could give primacy to the principle of
compactness and define the limits of tolerance for unorthodox district shape by imposing a measurable
limitation on the bizarre... calculated on the basis of a district's dispersion, perimeter, and population.")
The only other option, Justice Souter argues, is for the Court to ehrmnate the practice of disicting
altogether (substituting alternative forms of election, such as proportional or semi-proportional systems) or
to require random districting. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
Prior to this Term's cases, Richard Briffault had suggested a "political motivation" defense as another
alternative. See Briffault, supra note 19, at 71-79. Briffault argued that when empirical evidence supports
the position that race is salient to local politics, government action taking these facts into account does not
reflect the stereotypical thinking that Shaw condemns; racial classifications used in these circumstances
should therefore be understood to be politically, not racially, motivated and hence permissible To the extent
that the political motivation defense endorses the use of race as a proxy for nonracial objectives, such as
partisan ones-grouping blacks as blacks (rather than as Democrats) into a district for the purpose of
ensuring Democratic control-a second, less significant prong of Bush expressly rejects it Bush also holds
that, "to the extent race is used as a proxy for political characteristics, a racial stereotype requiring strict
scrutiny is in operation." 116 S. Ct. at 1956. Apparently this condemnation of stereotyping holds true no
matter how statistically accurate the underlying generalization Thus even though 97% of black voters in
and around Dallas voted Democratic. Bush precludes using race in this area as a proxy for political
affiliation. See id. To the extent that the political motivation defense endorses race-conscious distncting
beyond where the VRA requires it, last Term's cases raise serious questions about whether the doctrine
permits that. See supra note 115.
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be reasonably compact; that they respect certain preexisting political
subdivisions, such as county and city lines; that they reasonably adhere to
natural geographic boundaries, such as rivers and lakes; and most generally,
that majority-minority districts be drawn in ways consistent with judicially
ascribed conventions of districting.' 4' These conventional practices would not
be used to drive all districts toward some uniform national standard, but to
define extreme outer boundaries as the districting process comes under greater
siege on several fronts. While this is much like what the courts implementing
Shaw are doing already, that is precisely the point of the earlier arguments:
Whether courts acknowledge doing so or not, in practice Shaw is going to
require that courts focus less on "predominant motives" and more on giving
content to "traditional districting practices."
In addition, I believe some of these constraints would be most
administrable if specified in quantitative form; that is particularly so for the
criterion Shaw emphasizes most strongly, "extremely bizarre" shape. 4 While
some areas of constitutional law are perhaps best developed through case-by-
case interpretation of open-textured standards, there are specific reasons clear
rules are unusually important in this kind of judicial regulation of redistricting.
First, litigation typically focuses on an individual district and rarely examines
even other districts in the same state, let alone draws comparisons to districts
nationwide. Yet I suspect many people, including judges, would be surprised
to discover how contorted even the "average" congressional district is today.
Left to intuitive and ad hoc assessments of how bizarre a district is, judges are
likely to find many districts extreme that, in a statistical sense, are not. Even
if the doctrine does not itself get expressed in quantitative form, judicial
intuitions are likely to be far removed from the realities of redistricting absent
systematic comparisons to tutor those intuitions. Second, these cases are
exceptionally charged politically, racially, and ethnically. Leaving
implementation to ad hoc judicial assessments of whether districts deviate too
much from conventional practices invites both the appearance and reality of
judicial manipulation for selective ends. Third, unlike some constitutional
doctrines, the initial audience for Shaw is not sophisticated legal actors, but
politicians engaged in a highly partisan and self-interested task. However
subtle the Shaw doctrine might be in principle, it will be both misunderstood
and wilfully manipulated if expressed in nebulous terms. Finally, clear rules
can be the least intrusive judicial approach; once redistricters know the
constitutional constraints under which they must operate, they can frame
political bargains within the terms of those constraints. Legal uncertainty will
encourage some group of political actors to use that uncertainty itself for
political ends; if there are vague and unpredictable possibilities that courts will
141. "Conventional" here will inevitably be a mixed empirical and normative standard.
142. For advocacy of such standards, see Pildes & Niemi, supra note 6, at 557-59, 587.
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strike down a district, those probabilities will themselves influence the terms
of political dealmaking. Many of these concerns can be minimized through
adopting clearly specified principles as to what makes a district "extremely
bizarre"; the means most readily at hand to do so involve developing
quantitative norms of compact districting.
To be sure, courts can be predicted to resist turning to quantitative
measures and instead cling to more familiar legal categories like "intent,"
"reasonably compact," and "traditional districting practices." Any such
resistance, however, might have less to do with coherent implementation of
Shaw and more, one suspects, with implicit ideas about the proper forms of
legal authority. Put simply, courts are likely to be uncomfortable with social-
scientific formulas like compactness, perhaps in part because legal judgments
expressed in this form rather than through traditional legal categories are
thought to compromise the authority of law.
1 4
1
Framed in terms of the principles that Shaw reflects, the point of requiring
consistent adherence to specific districting practices would be judicially to
enforce the Court's nondiscrimination interpretation of the VRA through
distinguishing "excessive" from permitted uses of race. Some might object that
specifying objective circumstances beyond which districts could not go, even
to enhance minority representation, would inappropriately elevate the
importance of conventional districting practices. In its strongest form, the
critique might suggest that these practices themselves, such as compactness,
are themselves relics of eras in which concerns for representation of racial and
ethnic minorities were hardly paramount; or perhaps of a period in which
ethnic segregation, at least, was greater and therefore tracked geography more
closely. Yet it seems unlikely that conventional criteria, such as compactness,
contiguity, and respect for the boundaries of preexisting political units like
counties would have been designed to minimize political power of minorities,
although at times they have been manipulated to do so in practice. A more
plausible version of this critique would be that given how these criteria affect
the political influence of particular minority groups today, we ought to
reconsider whether those conventional practices ought to be retained.
Challenges to the entire system of single-member territorial districting are
likely to become more common in the coming years, and I have raised such
challenges myself.'" There is a difference, however, between wholesale
replacement of any electoral structure and selective abandonment of it to serve
particular interests. There are social costs to a two-tiered system of districting,
one in which most districts meet certain criteria while majority-minority
143. This topic of judicial resistance to relying on quantitauve formulas and the construction of legal
authority raises interesting questions that cannot be explored here. On legal form and the construction of
legal authority, see JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN (1986)
144. See. e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Kristen A. Donoghue, Cuinulative 1,bung in the United Stares.
1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241.
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districts look dramatically different. A second response to the objection to
basing constitutional doctrine on conventional districting practices is more
mundane. This response frequently appears as a vehicle for challenging Shaw
itself, rather than a basis for arguing how Shaw ought to be implemented.
From the pragmatic perspective this Essay takes, the question is the best
implementation approach among the plausible alternatives. Between specifying
extrinsic constraints on districting and ferreting out "predominant motives," the
former is more likely to lead to administrable, consistent doctrine that will do
less harm to the districting process.
Nonetheless, Shaw would still directly apply these constraints only to
minority-controlled districts. In one sense, that result flows from Shaw itself
and, again, is less a critique of these implementation suggestions than a
challenge to the basic principle of Shaw. While constitutional constraints
limited only to certain districts might nonetheless have broader effects by
influencing the culture of districting more generally, another alternative is that
Shaw will become only the first step in a broader judicial effort to respond to
the pressures the territorial districting system is facing more generally. Not
only would such a broader effort respond to criticisms that the Court is
singling out minority districts; it would also respond to additional forces that
will likely further erode the districting system if not addressed.
For example, new constitutional doctrine is another factor in the rise of
bizarre districting in the 1990s. The effects of this change are not widely
appreciated. In 1983, the Court held in Karcher v. Daggett145 that one
person, one vote requires virtually exact mathematical equality in the
population of each congressional district within a state, even more exact than
the margin of error in the Census data on which the districts are based.
Karcher thus elevated compliance with one person, one vote to a lexical
priority in congressional districting. As a result, states that engaged in
congressional districting in the 1990s could no longer rely upon other
principles, adherence to preexisting political boundary lines, or desire for
compact districts, to justify departures from exact population equality. Karcher
stands as one of the best exemplars of constitutional doctrine's perverse
effects.' 46 A principal purpose of the Court's "reapportionment revolution"
had been to constrain partisan and interest-group manipulation of districts. By
demanding equitable population distributions across districts, the cases
constrained legislators from "crazy-quilt" districting.1 47 As the Court
recognized at the time, these crazy-quilts did not reflect arbitrary patterns, but
a system that regularly enhanced the political power of particular groups, such
145. 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
146. Closely related to the counterproductive Karcher is Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969),
which held unconstitutional "a State's preference for pleasingly shaped districts" that yielded districts up
to 3.13% above and 2.84% below the ideal population levels. Id. at 536.
147. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568-70 (1964) (condemning crazy-quilt districting).
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as rural voters, with distinct political interests.'" One of the few meaningful
constraints on partisan and incumbent gerrymandering was the norm that
political subdivision boundaries, such as cities and counties, ought to be
respected. Karcher required that this constraint be abandoned in pursuit of a
"zero tolerance" policy with respect to population deviations. Yet at the very
moment Karcher was decided, this constraint-population equality-was
becoming virtually obsolete as a barrier to gerrymandering.' 9 With the
sophisticated computer technology available in the 1990s, fashioning districts
that comply with one-person, one-vote, while still pursuing the most self-
interested partisan ends, became an easy task.
Some of the distortions in current districts, particularly the increase in the
splitting of county and city lines, are no doubt attributable to the direct
commands of Karcher.'50 More indirectly, Karcher might also have
contributed to the breakdown of the tacit norms of districting noted above.'
3 '
As with the VRA, once fragmentation of county and city lines became
legitimated for one purpose, it may have become difficult to put the genie back
in the bottle. While Karcher played a significant role in the decline of the
political subdivision constraint, it is unlikely that Karcher is the dominant
factor in the general decline of compactness. Karcher applies nationwide,
which cannot explain the disproportionate rise in bizarrely shaped districts
precisely in those states that created new minority districts. In conjunction with
Shaw, if the Court is serious about responding to the extremes of districting in
the 1990s that will only get worse after the 2000 Census, the Court ought to
reconsider Karcher and permit minimal deviations from population equality
when justified by respect for preexisting political subdivisions." 2
The second factor that accounts for recent transformations in redistricting
is technological advance in data collection and computer technology. These
improvements have enhanced the capacity to gerrymander effectively.'
Recent cases now document in microscopic detail the astonishing precision
with which redistricters can carve up individual precincts and distribute them
148. See, e.g., Karcher, 462 U.S. at 729, 738-39 (noting that partisan politics played key role in
population deviations); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 580-81 (rcjecung state interest in fortifying representation
in sparsely populated areas).
149. A point the dissenters in Karcher rightly made. See Karcher, 462 U S at 775-76 (White. J.
dissenting) ("[A] decade of experience.., has shown that the rule of absolute equality is perfectly
compatible with gerrymandering of the worst sort") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
150. For example, in North Carolina, virtually all of Wake County. 423.380 people or 99 8% of the
population, was put into the Fourth Congressional District. while the remainder of Wake County-767
persons-was put into the Second District. See O'Rourke. supra note 30. at 763 n 177 This kind of county
splitting is almost certainly attributable to Karcher's demand for exact mathematical equality
151. See supra Section I.A.
152. One approach would be to apply the same constitutional standards that now govern state districts
to congressional districts; the former treat up to 10% variauons in district populations as de mimmis when
justified to preserve other legitimate state aims. See, e.g.. Mahan v. Howell. 410 U S 315 (1973)
153. Kay Butler has reported, from her involvement with South Carolina's 1990s redistricting, on the
effects of the more precise form in which Census data now comes. See Conference. supra note 27. at 16
(comments of Katharine Inglish Butler).
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between districts with confidence concerning the racial and partisan
consequences.154 The new technology not only facilitated naked pursuit of
partisan objectives, it also enhanced the ability to pursue these objectives under
the guise of complying with Karcher and the VRA. For example, in several
states, minority districts that could have been compact, had VRA compliance
been the sole objective, became more contorted simply because a bizarrely
contorted minority district had more desirable ancillary partisan and incumbent-
protection consequences.
55
As noted earlier, this practical interplay between political and racial
concerns will pose profound problems for the Court's "predominant motive"
approach to limiting gerrymandering' 56 The dramatic rise in bizarre
districting reflects several factors not readily disentangled; it is the conjunction
and synergy between these developments that have eroded the culture of
redistricting. One possible though subtle corollary might follow. If synergistic
interactions have indeed combined to erode the culture of districting, then
establishing formal boundaries on minority districts might restore tacit norms
that previously prevailed. Even if Shaw does not literally apply universally to
all districts, once extremely bizarre districts become unconstitutional in one
context, tacit norms regarding shape might be revived that would in practice
apply to all districts. Shaw-type constraints could well induce more general
acceptance of similar boundaries even when not formally required. The cultural
consequences of Shaw, in other words, might well be broader than its formal
legal scope.
Finally, another response to the current difference in constitutional
treatment between partisan-conscious and race-conscious districting is for the
Court, in light of Shaw, to develop similar extrinsic constraints against partisan
gerrymandering. 57 While race-conscious districting is a factor in the rise of
bizarre districting, it is not the only one. Efforts to distinguish the role of race
not only pose epistemological problems of great complexity, they also fail to
deal with the broader phenomenon. Despite the Court's reluctance to address
154. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1957-59 (1996) (plurality opinion); Moon v. Meadows,
No. 3:95CV942, 1997 WL 57432, at *6 n.6 (E.D. Va. 1997); cf. Diaz v. Silver, No. 95-CV-2591, 1997 WL
94175, at *7-8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1997) (documenting role of computer data in redistricting plan drawn
by state-court appointed referees).
155. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1955-56 (plurality opinion) (discussing rejection of proposed "relatively
compact 44% African-American district," centered on Dallas County, because of its effects on five
incumbent congressmen); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1906 (1996) (discussing possibility that
geographically compact minority district could have been drawn in south-central to southeastem North
Carolina).
156. See supra Part II.
157. While the Constitution purportedly constrains partisan gerrymandering, see Davis v. Bandemer,
478 U.S. 109 (1986), neither the Supreme Court nor other courts have given this doctrine any teeth at all.
Some scholars have called for more aggressive judicial enforcement of this doctrine, particularly in light
of Shaw. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard Pildes, No Place of Partisan Gerrymandering, TEX.
LAw., Aug. 5, 1996, at 25 ("[Ifn the wake of the recent decisions limiting racial gerrymandering, the court
might now feel an obligation to take more seriously the similar problems that political gerrymandering
poses.").
2554 [Vol. 106: 2505
Pildes
partisan gerrymandering, doing so might be the logical implication of the path
the Court has embarked on with Shaw.
IV. CONCLUSION
The system of territorial districting is under greater pressure today than at
any time since Congress first established the requirement of single-member
congressional districts in 1842.5 Technological and informational advances,
combined with legal and political pressures for more explicitly interest-based
approaches to representation, as reflected in the post-1982 VRA, are raising
practical and philosophical challenges to the continued plausibility of territorial
districting. The most dramatic response would be to abandon territorial
districting and follow the lead of most western democracies by adopting more
interest-oriented systems of representation, such as proportional
representation; 159 a more modest move in this direction would be greater
experimentation with alternative voting systems, such as cumulative voting,
limited voting, and preference voting. 6° Although local governments in the
United States are making greater use of these alternatives than many people
recognize,' 6 ' it is unrealistic to view as promising the political prospects for
significant change in this direction, particularly at the state and national levels.
A second appropriate response might be to develop stronger constraints,
including formal legal ones, on the politically self-interested manipulation of
the territorial-districting system. These constraints are not likely to emerge
through the ordinary political process, given the self-interest of existing office
holders who currently control the districting process. As long as we maintain
the basic system of territorial districting, pressure to preserve the core of its
integrity will likely be channelled toward the courts, which might in turn
generate increasing deployments of constitutional doctrine. In retrospect, it
should perhaps come as not wholly surprising that in the face of the
proliferation of extreme districting of many sorts for many purposes in the
1990s, doctrines like that in Shaw have begun to emerge.
If the Supreme Court remains committed to this line of response, two
questions will dominate the next phase of these developments. First, can courts
develop judicially administrable doctrines and principles to perform this role
effectively? This Essay has argued that intent-based approaches to constraining
redistricting, such as the recent though erratically adhered to "predominant
158. See Reapportionment Act of 1842, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491 (1842)
159. In a study of all lower-house elections conducted since 1945 in 27 democracies, only 17% used
the Anglo-American system of districting and majority rule. See AREND LUPHART. ELECTORAL SYSTEi.NS
AND PARTY SYSTEMS: A STUDY OF TWENTY-SEVEN DEMociACIEs 1945-1990. at 2. 48 (1994)
160. For discussion of these alternatives, see Richard Briffault. Lani Guiner and the Ddiemmas of
American Democracy, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 418 (1995); and Pildes & Donoghue. supra note 144
161. See Pildes & Donoghue, supra note 144. at 259-60
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motive" test of Miller,162 are ill-suited for this task. A better, if less
traditional, approach would be for courts to focus on specifying extrinsic and
more objectively definable legal constraints. Even so, the administrative aspects
of Shaw will be daunting. Second, will the Court move beyond doctrines that
explicitly constrain only race-conscious districting to more general doctrines
that confront the multiple fronts on which the system of territorial districting
is now under siege? 63 The failure to do so will not only make the Shaw
doctrine intractable administratively, given the entanglement of partisan,
incumbent-protection, racial, and ethnic considerations in redistricting. It will
also leave the Court open to the charge that its concerns for the integrity of the
territorial-districting system arise only when the challenges to that system
benefit the very groups that the VRA was designed to protect.
162. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
163. In a forthcoming casebook, a chapter devoted to districting approaches partisan and racial
gerrymandering as interrelated elements that are best addressed jointly if judicial doctrine is to be developed
to constrain the excesses of modem redistricting practices. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN,




APPENDIX I: COMPACTNESS OF 1980s AND 1990s CONGRESSIONAL
DISTRICTS, BY STATEl 6
DISPERSION SCORES PERIMETER SCORES
STATE RANGE _MEAN #.20 RANGE I MEAN #:.08
Alabama
1980s .28-.71 .44 .23-.46 .33
1990s .26-.48 .39 .11-.26 .18
Arizona
1980s .30-.47 .42 .23-.44 .33
1990s .30-.57 .41 .15-.47 .25
Arkansas
1980s .37-.54 .44 .21-.34 .28
1990s .35-.52 .44 .18-.35 .27
California
1980s .09-.54 .33 4 .06-.39 .20 5
1990s .04-.57 .39 2 .10-.45 .29 0
Colorado
1980s .31-.52 .43 .18-.44 .33
1990s .25-.56 .40 .15-.38 .26
Connecticut
1980s .27-.54 .40 .12-.37 .26
1990s .27-.55 .41 .20-.39 .32
Florida
1980s .16-.63 .40 1 .13-.56 .36 0
1990s .03-.56 .31 7 .01-.50 .20 6
Georgia
1980s .19-.48 .34 1 .16-.48 .28 0
1990s .17-.47 .34 1 .07-.32 .18 2
Hawaii
1980s .05-.30 .18 1 .11-.41 .26
1990s .05-.34 .19 1 .11-.38 .24
Idaho
1980s .21-.54 .38 .21-.36 .28
1990s .21-.56 .38 .20-.34 .27
Illinois
1980s .15-.53 .38 1 .14-.55 .30 0
1990s .19-.56 .34 1 .03-.52 .27 1
164. Originally published in Pildes & Niemi, supra note 6. at 571-73 (informauon provtded by
Election Data Services, Inc.). States with only one congressional representauve are excluded-
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DISPERSION SCORES PERIMETER SCORES
STATE RANGE MEAN #5.20 RANGE MEAN #<.08
Indiana
1980s .28-.53 .39 .16-.57 .33
1990s .25-.53 .39 .14-.57 .27
Iowa
1980s .31-.56 .42 .33-.46 .38
1990s .32-.54 .43 .30-.54 .41
Kansas
1980s .34-.54 .45 .33-.67 .50
1990s .35-.50 .44 .24-.51 .39
Kentucky
1980s .26-.51 .41 .22-.42 .29
1990s .21-.64 .38 .16-.36 .24
Louisiana
1980s .26-.60 .37 0 .09-.31 .24 0
1990s .13-.48 .31 2 .01-.23 .09 4
Maine
1980s .31-.45 .38 .12-.21 .17
1990s .31-.45 .38 .12-.21 .17
Maryland
1980s .18-.57 .39 1 .08-.40 .22 1
1990s .16-.51 .32 1 .08-.37 .18 1
Massachusetts
1980s .17-.51 .32 3 .02-.54 .23 1
1990s .14-.43 .28 2 .06-.28 .15 3
Michigan
1980s .20-.48 .35 1 .07-.51 .29 1
1990s .20-.63 .43 1 .07-.61 .38 1
Minnesota
1980s .35-.54 .40 .26-.56 .37
1990s .36-.56 .45 .22-.47 .35
Mississippi
1980s .29-.57 .46 .14-.41 .31 0
1990s .30-.52 .43 .08-.40 .21 1
Missouri
1980s .37-.59 .45 .24-.57 .39
1990s .34-.58 .44 .18-.53 .32
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DISPERSION SCORES PERIMETER SCORES
STATE RANGE MEAN #5.20 RANGE MEAN # _.08
Nebraska
1980s .27-.46 .34 .28-.56 .38
1990s .33-.45 .40 .26-.49 .39
Nevada
1980s .28-.54 .41 .25-.72 .49
1990s .43-.44 .43 .27-.56 .41
New
Hampshire .22-.32 .27 .18-.26 .22
1980s .23-.30 .26 .18-.23 .20
1990s
New Jersey
1980s .20-.58 .37 1 .10-.39 .21 0
1990s .11-.51 .33 2 .07-.37 .19 2
New Mexico
1980s .25-.48 .35 .26-.40 .34
1990s .36-.52 .44 .32-.37 .33
New York
1980s .06-.56 .30 6 .03-.39 .20 7
1990s .06-.55 .30 8 .02-.45 .20 8
North Carolina
1980s .26-.57 .36 0 .22-.46 .30 0
1990s .05-.44 .28 2 .01-.32 .09 8
Ohio
1980s .25-.53 .39 0 .09-.49 .31
1990s .20-.61 .38 1 .11-.58 .27
Oklahoma
1980s .23-.52 .37 .18-.27 .23
1990s .24-.59 .38 .16-.32 .22
Oregon
1980s .20-.45 .36 1 .23-.43 .30
1990s .22-.46 .37 0 .15-.44 .27
Pennsylvania
1980s .25-.55 .40 0 .10-.50 .27
1990s .16-.62 .39 1 .11-.45 .26
Rhode Island
1980s .18-.28 .23 1 .06-.21 .14 1
1990s .22-.46 .34 0 .22-.52 .37 0
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DISPERSION SCORES PERIMETER SCORES
STATE RANGE MEAN #5.20 RANGE MEAN #5.08
South Carolina
1980s .23-.50 .40 .22-.39 .31 0
1990s .22-.39 .31 .08-.29 .16 1
Tennessee
1980s .15-.43 .28 2 .13-.38 .26 0
1990s .12-.42 .30 1 .08-.26 .17 1
Texas
1980s .23-.57 .39 0 .12-.52 .26 0
1990s .19-.54 .31 5 .01-.38 .13 9
Utah
1980s .43-.51 .46 .27-.35 .31
1990s .32-.55 .46 .33-.40 .36
Virginia
1980s .20-.55 .37 1 .12-.44 .30 0
1990s .22-.52 .31 0 .06-.29 .17 2
Washington
1980s .26-.56 .38 0 .11-.42 .24
1990s .20-.53 .38 1 .12-.43 .25
West Virginia
1980s .26-.44 .32 0 .15-.31 .23
1990s .20-.39 .28 1 .11-.19 .15
Wisconsin
1980s .24-.51 .38 .19-.45 .30
1990s .25-.63 .39 .18-.72 .33
Nationwide
1980s .05-.71 .37 25 .02-.72 .28 16
1990s .03-.64 .36 40 .01-.72 .24 50
2560 [Vol. 106: 2505
Pildes
APPENDIX II: 1990S CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS WITH Low DISPERSION OR
PERIMETER COMPACTNESS SCORES'65
DISTRICT DISPERSION PERIMETER LARGEST % OF
SCORE SCORE POPULATION DISTRICT
GROUP POPULATION
CA36 .04 .10 White 69
FL3 .11 .01 Black 55
FL17 .08 .06 Black 56
FL18 .14 .03 Hispanic 67
FL22 .03 .05 White 83
H12 .05 .11 Asian 53
IL4 .19 .03 Hispanic 65
LA4 .13 .01 Black 66
LA6 .29 .05 White 82
MA3 .14 .11 White 78
MA10 .15 .06 White 94
NJ13 .11 .07 White 42
NY5 .19 .05 White 79
NY7 .22 .05 White 58
NY8 .06 .03 White 74
NY9 .27 .04 White 82
NY12 .12 .02 Hispanic 58
NCI .25 .03 Black 57
NC5 .14 .08 White 83
NC7 .29 .05 White 70
NC12 .05 .01 Black 56
TN4 .12 .08 White 95
TX3 .29 .05 White 86
TX6 .21 .02 White 88
TX18 .36 .01 Black 50
TX25 .20 .02 White 53
TX29 .19 .01 Hispanic 61
TX30 .24 .02 Black 49
165. Originally published in Pildes & Niemi, supra note 6, at 565 (information provided by Electron
Data Services, Inc.). Districts shown here are all those with a dispersion score of < 0 15 or a pcsunetcr
score of < 0.05. For the purpose of this Table. "White" means non-Hispanic white; "Black" means non-
Hispanic black; and "Asian" means Asian or Pacific Islander. "Hispanics" may be of any race. and
"population" refers to total population. Blacks and Hispanics constitute a majority in NJI 3 and TX30
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